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The old way involves accepting a set of 
assumptions that are without factual basis . . . 
Foremost on the list is the assumption that 
commitment for mental illness is a medical 
problem, not a legal problem. Therefore, since 
psychiatrists are the experts, their conclusions can 
be accepted without question. This fallacious 
assumption must be dispelled.  
 Judge P. Charles Jones1 
 
Michael is a single man in his forties.  Sometimes Michael 
drinks too much alcohol and his alcohol consumption has landed 
him in a hospital detox unit twice before. During his third stay in 
detox Michael’s family petitions the local district court to force 
him into a 30-day residential treatment program that takes place on 
the grounds of a local prison. Under order by the court, police 
bring Michael to the courthouse and place him in a holding cell 
while he awaits a hearing on his family’s petition. At the hearing 
Michael is represented by an attorney. After four days in detox 
Michael is completely sober, and no one contends that he is unable 
to think clearly; that he has committed or is suspected of having 
committed a crime; or that he poses any sort of danger to other 
people. Michael tells the court that he opposes the commitment 
petition; that he does not want to be hospitalized; and that the 
hospital has provided him with the names and phone numbers of a 
substance-abuse counselor and a local contact from Alcoholics 
Anonymous if he wants help in controlling his alcohol 
consumption. Michael asks the court to release him so that he can 
go home. The judge calls the court psychologist to the stand and 
asks whether, under the terms of the state’s involuntary 
commitment statute, Michael is an “alcoholic” whose use of 
alcohol is likely to cause “serious harm.” She answers in the 
affirmative, whereupon the judge orders Michael to be committed 
for 30 days against his will. The police place Michael in handcuffs 
and take him away. Next case. 
                                                
 1. Thomas K. Zander, Civil Commitment in Wisconsin: The Impact of 
Lessard v. Schmidt, 1976 WIS. L.  REV. 503, 503 (1976) (quoting Dane County, 
Wisconsin Judge Jones). 
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This is not merely a hypothetical. In a number of states, a 
person can be committed to a psychiatric facility against his will 
on grounds of “danger” or “risk of harm” to self as evidenced 
purely by the person’s consumption of alcohol or other 
intoxicating drugs, and the risk that continuing to ingest such 
substances will cause harm to the person, whether intended or not.2 
And the example raises a large and fundamental question for the 
law: When may a court force someone into psychiatric treatment 
against her will, based purely on the judgment—with which the 
patient herself expressly and coherently disagrees—that she needs 
                                                
 2. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 35 (2013) (defining 
“alcoholic” as “a person who chronically or habitually consumes alcoholic 
beverages to the extent that (1) such use substantially injures his health or 
substantially interferes with his social or economic functioning; or (2) he has 
lost the power of self-control over the use of such beverages”). The statute 
provides:  
Any police officer, physician, spouse, blood relative, guardian 
or court official may petition in writing any district court or 
any division of the juvenile court department for an order of 
commitment of a person whom he has reason to believe is an 
alcoholic or substance abuse . . . . In the event of the person’s 
failure to appear [at a court-ordered hearing in response to the 
petition], the court may issue a warrant for the person’s arrest . 
. . . If after a hearing and based upon competent testimony, 
which shall include, but not be limited to, medical testimony, 
the court finds that such person is an alcoholic . . . and there is 
a likelihood of serious harm as a result of the person’s 
alcoholism…the court may order such person to be committed 
for a period not to exceed ninety days [with intermittent 
reviews by the state health department at thirty, forty-five, 
sixty, and seventy-five days] . . . .The person may be 
committed to the Massachusetts correctional institution at 
Bridgewater, if a male, or at Framingham, if a female, if there 
are not suitable facilities available under said chapter 111B; 
provided, however, that the person so committed shall be 
housed and treated separately from convicted criminals. 
Id. See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-81-102, 112 (West 2013) (defining 
“alcoholic” as a person who habitually lacks self-control as to the use of 
alcoholic beverages or uses alcoholic beverages to the extent that his or her 
health is substantially impaired or endangered or his or her social or economic 
function is substantially disrupted; providing for the involuntary commitment of 
alcoholics who have threatened harm to themselves or others, or are 
“incapacitated by alcohol.”). 
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care? The laws of involuntary commitment typically specify that 
courts may do this when the person is “mentally ill” and poses a 
“danger” or “risk of harm” to self or others. But if “mental illness” 
can be defined as the voluntary consumption of intoxicating 
substances, and “danger” as risk of harm to the patient’s own 
health, what boundaries constrain the law’s power to force 
resisting individuals into treatment? 
Compassion may argue that mental illness should be 
treated. But for the law, compassion alone cannot dictate the 
answer. There is a Law of Compassion, which finds powerful 
expression in our positive law, establishing public programs that 
assist needy families, the unemployed, the elderly, the mentally ill. 
Such voluntary programs pose no threat to beneficiaries’ fund-
amental rights and freedoms. But when the law is asked, on 
grounds of compassion, to forcibly incarcerate a human being who 
poses no danger to others and has committed no crime, that is 
another matter entirely. In that situation the law’s first job is to act 
not as an agent of compassion but as an agent of respect for the 
individual. When it comes to involuntary commitment of the 
mentally ill, the law’s unique and vital role is to guard the rights of 
the person whose freedom is at stake. In our national conversation 
about mental illness and involuntary commitment, we have for-
gotten this fact. We must remember it again. When presented with 
a petition that would force an innocent person into psychiatric 
treatment against her will, the law’s presumptive role is to defend 
the perspective and the preferences of that person against society’s 
contrary preferences, including the contrary preferences of those 
who would offer treatment that the person does not want and has 
clearly said that she does not want. 
In this context the law’s job is very different— from and is 
sometimes in conflict with—the treatment imperative which 
dominates the mental health profession. That is worrisome, but 
may be necessary. In guarding the rights of the mentally ill, as in 
guarding the rights of all persons, the law must ask its own 
questions, enforce its own standards, and stand its ground against 
unjustified (although often well-intentioned) efforts that deprive 
innocent persons of basic freedoms. 
When a court forces an unwilling person into psychiatric 
treatment, the law deprives that person of two very important 
rights—the right to refuse medical treatment and (in the case of 
involuntary hospitalization) the right to liberty itself. In cases 
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where a psychologically disturbed respondent is believed to pose a 
serious danger to others, the state clearly has a legitimate interest in 
confining the respondent, and most discussion concerns the issue of 
dangerousness—how it is defined; how accurately it can be 
determined; how vulnerable it may be to bias or mistake.3 In cases 
involving risk of self-harm but not harm to others, the law more 
openly wrestles with the values of autonomy and respect for 
individual rights. Should we allow courts to commit a person 
involuntarily on the ground that he poses a serious risk of harm, not 
to others but to himself? If so, under what conditions is this 
permissible against the conceptual backdrop of the person’s 
presumptive rights to refuse treatment and to retain personal 
liberty? 
Psychiatry and Law have different perspectives, and 
inherently different roles, with respect to this issue. The con-
temporary standard for involuntary commitment—requiring both a 
“mental illness” and “danger to self”—attempts to marry those 
roles but has succeeded only in confusing the courts, too often 
causing them to convert what is fundamentally a legal question 
about legitimate grounds for overruling individual rights into a 
psychiatric question about the need for treatment. Reform efforts 
over the last three decades have not changed this reality. Indeed, 
today the loudest voices on the issue hail from the mental health 
profession, arguing that existing legal constraints on involuntary 
commitment are too stringent and that legal barriers should be 
dismantled so that more patients deemed mentally ill will be 
forcibly treated.4 This Article opposes that stance. The standard for 
involuntary commitment on grounds of danger to self should be 
articulated in non-medical terms and should be adjudicated as a 
purely legal matter. In making the case for that position, I hope to 
illuminate a core tension between law and psychiatry. 
 
 
                                                
 3. See infra p.7 and notes 15–16. 
 4. For example, see Eliminating the Barriers to the Treatment of Mental 
Illness, TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., available at www.treatmentadvocacycen- 
ter.org (2011) [hereinafter Eliminating the Barriers], summarizing the content 
and the history of this argument. 
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I. RIGHTS V. TREATMENT:  A CONFLICT BETWEEN LAW AND 
PSYCHOLOGY 
 
For most of U.S. history, the standard for involuntary 
commitment required only that mental health professionals certify 
the person was “mentally ill” and “in need of treatment.”5 That 
changed during the 1970s, when advocates for the mentally ill 
successfully championed a new standard which required both a 
psychiatric finding of “mental illness” and a legal finding of 
“danger to self or others” in order to hospitalize or treat a person 
against her will.6 Grounded in both the Due Process revolution 
which had significantly expanded the rights of criminal 
defendants,7 and the Civil Rights movement which had 
                                                
 5. See, e.g., Eric Turkheimer & Charles D. Parry, Why the Gap? 
Practice and Policy in Civil Commitment Hearings, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 646, 
646 (1992) [hereinafter Turkheimer & Parry, Why the Gap?]. 
Until the late 1960s most state commitment processes were 
medical rather than judicial. Under the State’s parens patriae 
powers, physicians had the authority to confine and treat the 
mentally ill. The most common form of commitment was the 
two-physician certificate, whereby patients could be 
hospitalized on the statement of two physicians, without 
advice of counsel, a hearing, or any recourse other than a writ 
of habeas corpus. 
Id.  
 6. In addition to this change in the substantive standard for involuntary 
commitment, a number of procedural changes were built into the standard 
during this period. See, e.g., id. at 646. 
The civil commitment reforms were both procedural and 
substantive. Procedurally, most states mandated due process 
safeguards, including prior notice, authority for judicial 
officials over clinicians, legal counsel, the right to call and 
confront witnesses, more rigorous standards of proof, LRAs, 
limited commitment periods, right to appeal, and regular court 
review. Substantively, the standards for involuntary 
commitment were changed from simple requirements for 
mental illness and need for treatment to legal standards of 
dangerousness to self or others and, in some states, grave 
disability or inability to care for self.”)  
Id. (citations omitted). 
 7. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that delinquency 
proceedings involving juvenile defendants must comply with procedural Due 
Process requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution). 
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successfully fought for legislation outlawing discrimination,8 the 
new standard for involuntary commitment was designed to give 
courts an independent role in the commitment decision, a role 
which would honor the patient’s presumptive right to refuse 
medical treatment.9 Under the dangerousness element, judges were 
to be the guardians of individual liberty, allowing forcible 
commitment only under circumstances in which a mentally ill 
respondent posed a clear and immediate risk of harm.10 
In a series of cases during the Seventies, both state and 
federal courts argued for the addition of a “dangerousness” prong 
to the traditional “need for treatment” standard. Many saw the 
traditional standard as too vague, overly biased toward medical (as 
opposed to rights-based) values, and discriminatory toward the 
mentally ill.11 California took the lead on the legislative front, 
passing the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act in 1967. The LPS 
                                                
 8. See, e.g., Stephen M. Crow et al., Who is at Greatest Risk of Work-
Related Discrimination – Women, Blacks, or Homosexuals?, 11 EMP. RESP. & 
RTS. J. 15 (1998) (discussing civil rights paradigm as basis for expanding rights 
of women, gays, and lesbians). See generally Paul S. Miller, Disability Civil 
Rights & a New Paradigm for the Twenty-First Century: The Expansion of Civil 
Rights Beyond Race, Gender, and Age, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 512 (1998). 
 9. See, e.g., VA Hiday & SJ Markell, Components of Dangerousness: 
Legal Standards in Civil Commitment, 3 INT’L J. OF LAW & PSYCHIATRY 405, 
405 (1980) [hereinafter Hiday & Markell, Components of Dangerousness] 
(“Dangerousness seemed to provide a legally enforceable test that would with 
one stroke protect the public’s safety and limit involuntary hospitalization to 
those who truly required confinement, while simultaneously allowing the non-
dangerous mentally ill to be treated in the community”); VA Hiday, Court 
Decisions in Civil Commitment:  Independence or Deference?, 4 INT’L J. L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 159, 160 (1981) (“[B]y specifying due process rights and requiring 
court hearings the new legislation is moving to check perfunctory or no court 
review. Essentially it is declaring that medical opinion alone is not enough to 
confine a person to a mental hospital; and thus, it is defining the role of the court 
to be independent of psychiatry. The court may accept medical 
recommendation[s]; but to achieve the desired independence from psychiatric 
expertise, the court must refuse to accept psychiatric conclusory statements 
without supporting facts”). 
 10. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1087 (E.D. Wis. 
1972) (“[U]nless constitutionally prescribed procedural due process 
requirements for involuntary civil commitment are met, no person should be 
subjected to ‘treatment’ against his will”). 
 11. See, e.g., id. at 1086–104. 
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Act, which took full effect in 1972, required a finding of 
dangerousness specified as either (1) danger to others; (2) danger to 
self; or (3) grave disability (which the California courts defined as 
a form of “danger to self.”).12 Other states followed suit, and by 
1978 all but two states had built “dangerousness” into their 
standards for involuntary commitment.13 
 During the 1970s and 1980s, a sizeable literature in 
psychology analyzed the dangerousness-based standard in general, 
and its “danger to others” prong in particular. Abolitionists, some 
of whom had favored the reforms on grounds that they would 
restrict the power of the state to commit unwilling people for 
treatment, continued to fight for the abolishment or near-
abolishment of such forced hospitalizations.14 Within the mental 
health profession, the new standard remained controversial among 
some psychologists and psychiatrists who worried that it prevented 
the mental-health system from helping patients who desperately 
needed (but sometimes opposed) hospitalization and treatment.15 
                                                
 12. See, e.g., SP Segal et al., Civil Commitment in the Psychiatric 
Emergency Room, 45 ARCH GEN. PSYCHIATRY 753 (1988); Doe v. Gallinot, 486 
F. Supp. 983 (S.D. Cal. 1979), aff’d 657 F.2d 1017, (9th Cir. 1981) (grave 
disability element “implicitly requires a finding of harm to self”). 
 13. See, e.g., Hiday & Markell, Components of Dangerousness, supra 
note 9. 
       14. See generally RALPH SLOVENKO, LAW IN PSYCHIATRY/ PSYCHIATRY 
IN LAW, 433 (2009); BRUCE J. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL 
PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS, AND THE LAW (1972); American Association for the 
Abolition of Involuntary Mental Hospitalization, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1698 
(1971) (Letter to the Editor by AAAIMH founder Thomas Szasz); Stephen J. 
Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of 
the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REV. 54 (1982) [hereinafter Morse, A 
Preference for Liberty].  
 15. E.g., Paul Chodoff, The Case of Involuntary Hospitalization of the 
Mentally Ill, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 496 (1976); Pauline Rabin & David Folks, 
Dangerousness as the Criterion for Involuntary Hospitalization: A Time to 
Reassess, 246 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 990 (1981); Donald A. Treffert, Dying With 
Their Rights On, 2 PRISM 49, 49–52 (1974). As I explore infra Part II.C., this 
view has acquired considerable momentum in the wake of deinstitutionalization. 
For more contemporary iterations, see, e.g., PS Appelbaum, Almost a 
Revolution: An International Perspective on the Law of Involuntary Comm-
itment, 25 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 135 (1997); Minds on the Edge: Facing 
Mental Illness: Fred Friendly Seminars, Columbia University, New York  (PBS 
television broadcast Oct. 2009) [hereinafter Minds on the Edge]. See also 
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Scholars analyzed various problems with implementing the new 
standard—for example, the difficulty of deciding which kinds of 
harm justified involuntary commitment; the difficulty of deciding 
what degree of risk justified forcibly committing someone against 
his will; and, the difficulty of assessing the actual risk that any 
particular respondent will inflict harm, particularly where the 
respondent had never in fact committed a violent harm and the fear 
was simply that he or she might do so in the future.16 
Oddly, almost none of the discussion has specifically 
focused on the “danger to self” aspect of the modern test. Almost 
all states allow forcible commitment of a person on grounds of 
“danger” or “risk of harm” to self; yet most literature on the subject 
treats “danger to self or others” as a single concept and argues its 
virtues and vices in that manner.17 
That is a mistake. Although there is sometimes significant 
overlap, the concept of “danger to self” is importantly different 
from that of “danger to others.” Even allowing for all the problems 
associated with forcibly confining someone on grounds of danger 
                                                                                                         
Eliminating the Barriers, supra note 4, for a prominent voice in favor of 
involuntary commitment based on need for treatment (often referred to as “grave 
disability”) alone. 
 16. See, e.g., Morse, A Preference for Liberty, supra note 14; Edward P. 
Mulvey & Charles W. Lidz, Back to Basics: A Critical Analysis of Danger-
ousness Research in a New Legal Environment, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 209 
(1985); J. C. Phelan & B.G. Link, The Growing Belief That People With Mental 
Illnesses Are Violent: The Role of the Dangerousness Criterion for Civil 
Commitment, 33 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY, S7 (1998); 
SP Segal et al., Civil Commitment in the Psychiatric Emergency Room: The 
Assessment of Dangerousness by Emergency Room Clinicians, 45 ARCHIVES 
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 748 (1988); SA Shah, Dangerousness: A Paradigm for 
Exploring Some Issues in Law and Psychology, 33 AM. PSYCHOL. 224 (1978); 
Carol A. B. Warren, Involuntary Commitment for Mental Disorder: The 
Application of California’s Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, 11 L. & SOC’Y REV. 
629 (1976). 
 17. A partial, but notable, exception is Alan M. Dershowitz, Psychiatry 
in the Legal Process: “A Knife That Cuts Both Ways,” 51 JUDICATURE 370 
(1967). Although Dershowitz’s main point is that the insanity and commitment 
standards should be purely legal and not medicalized, he does raise the 
libertarian argument (a la John Stuart Mill) as to involuntary commitment on 
grounds of “danger to self,” and he explores some interesting hypotheticals 
which are meant to test out the premises of that standard. 
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to others,18 few doubt that preventing foreseeable violence inflicted 
upon innocent others is a legitimate concern of the state. Not so 
when the question is whether the state should be able to force 
treatment on someone in order to prevent him from inflicting harm 
on himself. As to that question, our intuitions are more libertarian:19 
At least presumptively, the state should refuse to interfere with the 
clearly expressed preferences of adult persons (e.g., the preference 
not to receive psychiatric treatment) even if the state disagrees with 
the wisdom of those preferences. 
Should the law of involuntary commitment instantiate the 
libertarian view? Two extremes define the spectrum of answers to 
this question. At one end are Abolitionists, according to whom 
involuntary civil commitment is always wrong no matter what the 
circumstances. Abolitionists argue that no justification exists for 
treating mentally ill persons differently from any others—that 
forcing such persons to undergo treatment or incarceration against 
their will is not justified unless and until they have committed a 
crime.20 We do not permit the state to engage in preventive 
detention of non-mentally ill persons simply on the grounds that 
they may be dangerous. Suicide (for example) is not a crime. Thus, 
to authorize civil preventive detention of those deemed mentally ill 
and a “danger to self” is to invidiously discriminate against the 
mentally ill.21 
                                                
      18. See sources cited supra notes 15–16.  
     19. In the sense that we incline more toward the view of John Stuart Mill 
in this famous passage from On Liberty:  
The only purpose for which power can rightfully be 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He cannot 
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be 
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, 
because . . . to do so would be wise or even right . . . .  
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Penguin Books 1974).   
 20. See, e.g., Chodoff, supra note 15 (describing, though not favoring, 
the abolitionist position). 
 21. See, e.g., id.; see also ENNIS, supra note 14; Morse, A Preference for 
Liberty, supra note 14; Jacob Sullum, The Legal and Moral Problems of 
Involuntary Commitment, Mental Health and the Law, CATO UNBOUND, Aug. 
24, 2012, http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/08/24/Jacob-sullum/legal-moralpr- 
oblems-involuntary-commitment; Jeffrey Schaler, Strategies of Psychiatric 
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At the other extreme are Paternalists, who argue that courts 
should be able to forcibly commit a person if and when mental 
health professionals determine that the person is in serious need of 
treatment. Such treatment, presumptively at least, would continue 
until the experts determine that the patient no longer needs it. 
Paternalists argue that the contemporary rights-based standard of 
involuntary commitment denies treatment to desperately needy 
persons for whom a period of enforced hospitalization might 
significantly improve, or even save, their lives.22 For such pro-
treatment advocates, the refusal to hospitalize (or force outpatient 
treatment upon) mentally ill patients who cannot responsibly care 
for themselves is cruel and inhumane, and a legal standard which 
makes it difficult or impossible to force such treatment has created 
a society in which mentally ill people are “dying with their rights 
on.”23 
Some understanding of history will be helpful here. Part II 
of this essay traces the victory of the rights-based standard for 
involuntary commitment, and also the push-back from Pro-
Treatment forces. Part III engages the bedrock conceptual issues 
presented by involuntary civil commitment in cases of “danger to 
self”, using two paradigmatic cases of foreseeable self-harm to 
examine the justifications for forcing persons into psychiatric 
treatment. Part III more closely engages the core concepts of 
“mental illness” and “danger to self”—the medical and the legal 
prongs of the test for involuntary commitment—and forces an 
examination of each prong separately and of the test as a whole. 
Like other legal tests (such as the tests for insanity) which attempt 
to marry law and psychology, the test for involuntary civil 
commitment highlights an important and recurring conflict between 
the law’s focus on individual rights and psychiatry’s focus on 
treating illness. I argue that where state coercion on grounds of 
danger to self is the core issue, the involuntary commitment 
                                                                                                         
Coercion, Mental Health and the Law, CATO UNBOUND, Aug. 6, 2012, 
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/08/06/jeffrey-schaler/strategies-psychiatric-
coercion. 
  22. See, e.g., sources supra note 15. 
      23. Treffert, Dying With Their Rights On, supra note 15; Minds on the 
Edge, supra note 15.  
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decision should be wholly grounded in legal, and not medical, 
principles. 
 
 II. LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT: 
SOME HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Less than a decade after the nationwide adoption of the 
“mentally ill and dangerous” standard for involuntary commitment, 
scholars and commentators identified a troublesome “gap” between 
the letter and spirit of the new commitment laws.24 One author 
summed up the issue as follows: 
 
The failure of civil commitment procedures to meet 
statutory requirements is one of the more reliable 
findings in the applied social sciences. Most states 
now require specific legal procedures and 
behavioral standards for involuntary hospitalization 
Nonetheless, empirical studies have demonstrated 
that commitment hearings are rarely adversarial 
and clinical concerns continue to take precedence 
over legal issues.25 
 
Thus, while reformers had envisioned a system in which 
attorneys for patients adopted an adversarial role in zealous defense 
of their clients’ interests and courts operated as independent 
guardians of patients’ rights, the reality was that attorneys often 
failed to adopt an adversary role; judges frequently failed to make 
respondents’ rights known to them in court; and, in direct 
contradiction to the role assigned them by statute, judges continued 
to defer to the recommendations of mental health experts on both 
the questions of “mental illness” and “dangerousness” required to 
commit respondents against their will.26 And while reformers had 
predicted that the dangerousness-based standard would shrink the 
                                                
 24. See, e.g., Roger Peters et al., The Effects of Statutory Change on the 
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 73  (1987); Warren, 
Involuntary Commitment for Mental Disorder: The Application of California’s 
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, supra note 16. 
 25. Turkheimer & Parry, supra note 5, at 646. 
 26. Id. at 647. 
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number of involuntary commitments because it would offer greater 
respect and protection to a respondent’s wish not to be treated, 
empirical research revealed that the new and supposedly stricter 
commitment statutes were having little if any effect on the rate of 
involuntary commitments across the country.27 It seemed that the 
rights-based vision had succeeded in changing the language of state 
statutes but had failed to change the law on the ground, in court, 
where the fate of patients and commitment petitions was being 
decided under the supposedly new standard. 
 Why?  What explains the emergence of a gap between the 
standards set out in commitment statutes and the courts’ apparent 
failure to comply with those standards when faced with actual 
petitions for involuntary commitment? This Part re-examines the 
historical evolution of the dangerousness standard for involuntary 
commitment, looking for possible answers to these questions. I 
focus on three key participants in the legal and political debate 
which drove the passage of dangerousness-based statutes – (1) the 
anti-psychiatry movement, including lawyers and advocates for the 
rights of mentally ill people; ex-patients whose skepticism about 
psychiatry and psychiatric treatments fueled the abolitionist belief 
that involuntary civil commitment should simply not exist; and a 
relatively small number of renegade psychiatrists, the most 
prominent of whom was Thomas Szasz; (2) lawyers who viewed 
the old, “need for treatment” commitment procedures as a violation 
of patients’ rights and sought to deploy the Due Process model of 
In Re Gault in order to change those procedures; and (3) the 
mainstream community of psychologists, psychiatrists, and other 
mental health professionals, many of whom opposed the incursion 
of procedural and substantive due process into involuntary 
commitment procedures on the ground that such procedures were 
bad for patients. On the surface, the nationwide move to a danger-
ousness-based commitment standard seemed to be a dramatic 
victory for the law and for the lawyer-driven fight to erase stigma 
and discrimination against the mentally ill. But beneath that surface 
                                                
 27. Id.  See also James W. Luckey & John J. Berman, Effects of a New 
Commitment Law on Involuntary Admissions and Service Utilization Patterns, 3 
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 149 (1979); J. Monahan et al., Stone-Roth Model of Civil 
Commitment and the California Dangerousness Standard, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 1267 (1982). 
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the debate between the rights-based dangerousness standard and the 
medical “need for treatment” standard played out in quite a 
different way. 
 
A. Anti-Psychiatry Meets the Due Process Revolution 
 
The anti-psychiatry movement took root in the widespread 
social and political unrest of the 1960s and 70s. Amid deepening 
skepticism and mistrust of social, religious, governmental, and 
military institutions, critics from both left and right depicted 
psychiatry – particularly its power to define mental illness and to 
justify and set in motion state coercion against those deemed 
mentally ill – as a tool of the oppressor state, a means of routing the 
different, the defiant, and the dissident into mental hospitals.28 The 
voice linking psychiatry and justice was always implicit in this 
critique, but that voice became an open battle cry when four young 
lawyers – Bruce Ennis, Charles Halpern, Paul Friedman, and 
Margaret Ewing – formed the Mental Health Law Project (MHLP) 
in 1972. Drawing heavily on the views of libertarian psychiatrist 
Thomas Szasz, whose anti-psychiatry crusade caught fire in the 
United States about this time, Ennis and the MHLP took an 
abolitionist position on involuntary commitment. They sought not 
merely to constrain its availability or limit its effects, but to abolish 
it entirely. In a preface to Ennis’s book Prisoners of Psychiatry: 
Mental Patients, Psychiatrists, and the Law, Dr. Szasz praised 
Ennis for endorsing the abolitionist view “that individuals 
                                                
 28. This critique was highly ideological, from both ends of the political 
spectrum. See, e.g., Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Asylum, in THE FOUCAULT 
READER 141 (Rabinow ed., 1984); R. D. Laing, The Schizophrenic Experience, 
in THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE 100 (1967); ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: 
ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 
(1961); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER 
AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971); THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF 
MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF PERSONAL CONDUCT (1974); 
Andrew T. Scull, Madness and Segregative Control: The Rise of  the Insane 
Asylum, 24 SOC. PROBS. 337 (1977). Perhaps the chief critic of psychiatry from 
the libertarian perspective was Thomas Szasz. See, e.g., THOMAS S. SZASZ, 
LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY:  AN INQUIRY INTO THE SOCIAL USES OF 
MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICES (1989); Thomas S. Szasz, J’Accuse: Psychiatry 
and the Diminished American Capacity for Justice, 2 POL. PSYCHOL. 106 
(1980). See also, ENNIS, supra note 14; SLOVENKO, supra note 14. 
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incriminated as mentally ill do not need guarantees of treatment but 
protection against their enemies—the legislators, judges, and 
psychiatrists who persecute them in the name of mental health.”29 
And in a 1974 interview published in Madness Network News, 
Ennis declared: “My personal goal is either to abolish involuntary 
commitment or to set up so many procedural roadblocks and 
hurdles that it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the state to 
commit people against their will.”30 
Until abolition became politically possible, Due Process 
would have to do. Warren Court decisions such as In Re Gault 
offered the legal framework on which advocates for the mentally ill 
based a national campaign to make involuntary civil commitment 
more difficult, more time-limited, and less dependent on a 
psychiatric (and thus by definition oppressive and unjust) decision 
that the respondent “needs treatment.”31 In Gault, handed down in 
1967, the United States Supreme Court decided that when a judg-
ment of delinquency is at stake, states must offer juveniles the full 
panoply of procedures required under the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause in adult criminal trials—including the right to 
timely notice of charges, the right against self-incrimination, the 
right to confront witnesses, and the right to defense counsel.32 The 
Court rejected the state’s argument that such due process 
protections should not apply to juveniles because the state acts as 
parent, not adversary, to juvenile defendants. 
The Court’s decision in Gault offered an apt due process-
based model for another legal setting involving the deprivation of 
liberty—involuntary commitment proceedings. As in Gault, states 
in commitment cases had long argued for a lower due process 
standard on the grounds that commitment is not a criminal 
adjudication, that the state acts not as an adversary to the 
respondent but instead as parens patriae.33 In Lessard v. Schmidt, 
the court engaged, and rejected, the parens patriae argument, 
                                                
 29. Id. 
 30. SLOVENKO, supra note 14, at 433. 
 31. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 32. Id.  
 33. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wisc. 1972) 
(discussing and ultimately rejecting this argument).   
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expressly modeling its response on the High Court’s opinion in 
Gault.34 
In Lessard, the Plaintiff, Alberta Lessard, was detained by 
police after what they believed was a suicide attempt. She was 
confined in a psychiatric hospital on a succession of petitions by 
police and medical personnel, was diagnosed as paranoid 
schizophrenic, and was repeatedly interviewed and examined 
without prior notice or opportunity to contest the various medical 
and legal judgments being made about her by the police, court 
personnel, judge, and psychiatrist involved in the case. Eventually 
Ms. Lessard hired her own attorney and was conditionally released 
under an ongoing 30-day commitment order. Ms. Lessard became 
the lead defendant in a class action suit against Wisconsin, alleging 
that the state’s procedure for involuntary civil commitment denied 
her due process of law. In Lessard, the court agreed with her, 
holding that Wisconsin’s statutory commitment procedure violated 
procedural due process in a number of respects that paralleled 
Gault. Like the statute invalidated in Gault, Wisconsin’s comm-
itment law failed to give detainees adequate notice of proceedings 
which could deprive them of the fundamental right of liberty; failed 
to mandate a hearing before commitment; failed to provide for the 
right to counsel or the right against self-incrimination; permitted 
involuntary commitment on an inadequate standard of proof; and 
failed to require that those petitioning for commitment consider 
less restrictive alternatives before seeking this drastic remedy.35 
 
B. Lessard and the Standard of Dangerousness 
 
In addition to finding numerous procedural due process 
errors in the Wisconsin statute, the court in Lessard addressed and 
endorsed the need to add dangerousness to the substantive standard 
for involuntary civil commitment. The court traced the danger-
ousness standard back to the 1845 Massachusetts case, Matter of 
Josiah Oakes,36 in which the state supreme court held: 
 
                                                
 34. Id.  
 35. See generally id. 
      36. Matter of Josiah Oaks, 8 Law Rep. 123 (Mass. 1845). 
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The right to restrain an insane person of his liberty is 
found in that great law of humanity, which makes it 
necessary to confine those whose going at large 
would be dangerous to themselves or others . . . . 
And the necessity which creates the law, creates the 
limitation of the law.  The questions must then arise 
in each particular case, whether a patient’s own 
safety, or that of others, requires that he should be 
restrained for a certain time, and whether restraint is 
necessary for his restoration or will be conducive 
thereto. The restraint can continue as long as the 
necessity continues. This is the limitation, and the 
proper limitation.37 
 
The court in Lessard went on to make a point that would become 
crucial to the development and application of the dangerousness 
standard in the reformed commitment statutes passed during the 
seventies. “Unfortunately,” the court noted:  
 
 neither the Massachusetts court in Oakes, nor other 
courts to follow felt much concern for either a 
definition of ‘dangerousness’ or the effects of 
deprivations of liberty upon those committed . . . . 
The erosion of the common law of dangerousness 
continued . . . with the result that many statutes today 
permit commitment based upon a wide range of 
showings of ‘mental illness.38 
 
It was this perceived defect—the fact that most statutes 
allowed involuntary commitment upon a finding of mental illness 
and need for treatment, without more and without defining either 
“dangerousness” or “mental illness” in ways which clearly limited 
such confinement—that the legal advocates for the mentally ill 
sought to change in the 1970s. By adding back a vigorous 
requirement of dangerousness, making that requirement a separate 
element of the commitment standard, and assigning courts the role 
of assessing dangerousness as a legally-grounded, rights-focused 
                                                
      37.  Id. at 125, cited in Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1085.  
 38. Id. at 1086 (emphasis added). 
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element of the standard, advocates hoped to make courts less 
deferential to psychiatric findings of “mental illness” and more 
attuned to the serious deprivations of liberty inherent in the act of 
committing a person to a mental institution against his will. 
Three years after the landmark opinion in Lessard, the 
United States Supreme Court seemed to drive this point home. In 
O’Connor v. Donaldson,39 the Court held that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from forcibly 
confining non-dangerous persons who are capable of surviving 
“safely” by themselves or with the aid of family and friends.40 In 
the decades since that holding, discussion of Donaldson has 
focused heavily on the psychology side of the conversation, for 
example on the question of what (if anything) the Donaldson Court 
said about committed patients’ right to treatment, or what (if 
anything) it said about committing mentally ill persons who are not 
dangerous but who are deemed “in need of treatment”—for 
instance, whose condition may deteriorate if untreated; or who are 
mentally ill and lack family and friends to help them maintain a 
treatment regimen.41 Here, we look at Donaldson from a rights-
focused perspective. 
In January 1957, respondent Kenneth Donaldson was 
diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic and was committed to the 
Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee. For the next fifteen years, 
Donaldson was held at the hospital against his will, despite his 
repeated attempts to secure release on the grounds that he was not 
dangerous to himself or others; that he was not mentally ill; and 
                                                
 39. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
 40. Id. at 576 (“In short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without 
more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom 
by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or 
friends”). The Court vacated and remanded the judgment of the lower court on 
other grounds.  Id.  
 41. See, e.g., Daniel Baldwin, O’Connor v. Donaldson: Involuntary Civil 
Commitment and the Right to Treatment, 7 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 573 
(1975); L. E. Kopolow, A Review of Major Implications of the O’Connor v. 
Donaldson Decision, 133 AM. J.  PSYCHIATRY 379 (1976); Loren H. Roth, 
Mental Health Commitment: The State of the Debate, 31 HOSP. & CMTY. 
PSYCHIATRY 385 (1980); O’Connor v. Donaldson, TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., 
available at http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/compnent/content/article/3 
41 (calling the Court’s opinion in Donaldson “probably the single most 
important decision in mental health law”).  
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that he was not receiving treatment at the hospital.42 In 1971, 
Donaldson brought suit under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1996), 
alleging that hospital superintendent Dr. J.B. O’Connor, and others, 
had “intentionally and maliciously deprived him of his 
constitutional right to liberty.”43 The jury agreed, awarding Donald-
son both compensatory and punitive damages, after being 
instructed by the trial judge that it should award punitive damages 
only if “the act or omission of the Defendant or Defendants which 
proximately caused injury to the Plaintiff was maliciously or 
wantonly or oppressively done.”44 
The facts of the case powerfully reinforced the dangers of 
forcible commitment under a “grave need for treatment” standard.45 
Donaldson was hospitalized under a provision of the Florida law 
that then allowed such commitment for the purpose of “care, 
maintenance, and treatment.”46 Testimony at the trial proved that 
Donaldson had never—either before or after he was committed—
posed a danger to himself or others.47 Dr. O’Connor himself 
acknowledged that he had neither personal nor second-hand 
knowledge of any dangerous act ever committed by Donaldson.48 
No evidence showed that Donaldson had ever been a suicide risk, 
and one of O’Connor’s codefendants conceded that Donaldson had 
earned his own living outside the hospital for fourteen years before 
his commitment and that he was capable of supporting himself 
outside the hospital. Indeed, immediately after his release from the 
hospital in 1971, Donaldson got a responsible job in hospital 
administration.49 Further, under the law and regulations at the time, 
                                                
 42. 422 U.S. at 564–65. 
 43. Id. at 565. 
 44. Id. at 571 n.7. 
      45. It is assuredly no coincidence that Bruce Ennis, a leader in the move 
to introduce Due Process protections into civil commitment proceedings, argued 
the case for Donaldson.  Id. at 564. See also supra text accompanying notes 28–
30 (summarizing Ennis’s role in the civil commitment reforms of the 1970s and 
1980s). 
 46. Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 565–66 n.2. 
      47.       Id. at 563 
 48. Id. at 568. 
 49. Id. Dr. O’Connor had resigned as hospital superintendent by the time 
of trial. Shortly after that resignation, Donaldson—with the help of the hospital 
staff— successfully secured his release from the hospital—again, after a 
confinement of almost fifteen years.  
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the hospital staff had the power to release a mentally ill patient who 
was not dangerous to self or others. Apparently displeased with 
Donaldson’s attempts to be released and his refusal to cooperate 
with hospital staff, Dr. O’Connor denied Donaldson’s requests for 
such release, even when those requests were supplemented by a 
halfway house, Helping Hands, which offered to care for 
Donaldson, and by a letter from the respected Minneapolis Clinic 
of Psychiatry and Neurology, which supported Donaldson’s 
release.50 According to the Supreme Court’s opinion:   
 
O’Connor rejected the offer, replying that 
Donaldson could be released only to his parents. 
That rule was apparently of O’Connor’s own 
making. At the time, Donaldson was 55 years old, 
and, as O’Connor knew, Donaldson’s parents were 
too elderly and infirm to take responsibility for him. 
Moreover, in his continuing correspondence with 
Donaldson’s parents, O’Connor never informed 
them of the Helping Hands offer.51 
 
 O’Connor also rejected an offer of help from a college classmate 
and longtime family friend of Donaldson’s, John Lembcke, who 
petitioned for Donaldson to be released into his care.52 Dr. 
O’Connor testified that he rejected all these requests on the grounds 
of his conviction that Donaldson would not have made a 
“successful adjustment outside the institution”—but at trial 
O’Connor could not remember the basis for that conclusion.53 Dr. 
O’Connor characterized Donaldson’s care at the hospital as “milieu 
therapy”—custodial care that is not geared toward improving or 
                                                
 50. Id. (“The [halfway house] request was accompanied by a supporting 
letter from the Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology, which a 
codefendant conceded was a ‘good clinic’”). 
 51. Id. at 568–69. 
 52. Id. at 569. The Court adds here: “The [trial] record shows that 
Lembcke was a serious and responsible person, who was willing and able to 
assume responsibility for Donaldson’s welfare.”  
 53. Id. at 568. 
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curing the patient’s mental illness.54 The conditions on the ward 
were hardly conducive to good care: Donaldson was frequently 
housed in a large room with 60 other patients, some of whom had 
been criminally committed.55 Finally, shortly after Dr. O’Connor 
resigned as superintendent of the hospital, Donaldson—with the 
help of the hospital staff—successfully petitioned for restoration of 
his competency and for his release from involuntary care.56 
The facts in Donaldson gave credence to the abolitionist 
argument that the law should not permit forcible commitment 
based only on the discretionary judgments of mental health 
professionals.57 Even assuming that Kenneth Donaldson had been 
correctly diagnosed with a serious “mental illness”—about which 
the Supreme Court expressed skepticism58—the use of legal 
                                                
 54. Id. at 569 (“[W]itnesses from the hospital staff conceded that, in the 
context of this case, ‘milieu therapy’ was a euphemism for confinement in the 
‘milieu’ of a mental hospital”). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 568. 
 57. See, e.g., supra main body text accompanying notes 20−21. 
 58. Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 584 (“There can be little responsible debate 
regarding ‘the uncertainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of 
professional judgment.’”) (quoting Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 
375 (1956)). The Court’s view echoed a high degree of public skepticism about 
the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis at the time. Only two years before the 
Court’s decision in Donaldson, psychiatry had been greatly embarrassed by the 
publication in Science magazine of the now-famous Rosenhan experiment. 
David L. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCI. 250 (1973).  
Rosenhan sent a group of healthy associates to twelve different mental hospitals 
in five states. Id. These pseudo-patients attempted to gain admission to the 
hospitals as patients by falsely claiming to suffer from auditory hallucinations. 
All were admitted and diagnosed with psychiatric disorders. Id. While in the 
hospital, all the patients behaved normally and informed the staff that they felt 
fine and were not experiencing any more hallucinations. Id. Nonetheless, 
Rosenhan’s pseudopatients spent an average of nineteen days in the hospital. Id. 
In order to gain release all were forced to agree to take antipsychotic 
medications, and all except one were diagnosed with schizophrenia “in 
remission.” Id. The uproar over the Rosenhan experiment was a significant 
factor in psychiatry’s subsequent turn toward diagnostic verifiability and 
reliability, a move which took center stage in the profession with the publication 
of the DSM III in 1980. Id.; see, e.g., Mitchell Wilson, DSM-III and the 
Transformation of American Psychiatry: A History, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 399 
(1993).  
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coercion to enforce the judgment of a psychiatrist, without giving 
courts an independent basis on which to question those judgments 
and guard the patient’s presumptive right to refuse treatment, put 
vulnerable patients at the mercy of psychiatric professionals like 
O’Connor, whose judgments could be influenced by personal 
pique, personal dislike of a patient, or other reasons not relevant to 
the patient’s welfare or legal rights. The hope of reformers was to 
give the law an independent basis—the “dangerousness” standard—
upon which to ensure that involuntary commitment was confined to 
those mentally ill patients who really posed a serious risk of harm 
to themselves or others. 
But the apparent victory of legal advocates for the mentally 
ill, whose arguments persuaded legislatures across the land to adopt 
dangerousness-based standards for involuntary commitment, has 
been replaced by a growing sense of failure. Whatever the statutes 
said, it soon became clear that in actual court proceedings, 
“dangerousness” was often treated either as synonymous with 
“mental illness,” or at least as primarily the concern of mental 
health professionals. In short, the courts were not using 
dangerousness as a way of limiting the reach of involuntary 
commitment or of staking the law’s independence from psychiatric 
judgments.59 
In explaining this failure we should look to the crucial role 
played by those in the mainstream clinical community, especially 
(1) mental health professionals who evaluate detainees and testify 
in court as to their mental health and dangerousness; and (2) judges 
who, although charged with the statutory duty of making a final 
judgment about whether the law should force someone into 
treatment, frequently short-circuited the required legal judgment by 
deferring to the medical one.60 
                                                
 59. See, e.g., Joel Haycock et al., Mediating the Gap: Thinking About 
Alternatives to the Current Practice of Civil Commitment, 20 NEW ENG. J.  
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 265 (1994) [hereinafter Mediating the Gap] 
(discussing “vast formal expansion of procedural and substantive rights [in 
involuntary commitment proceedings, which] has led to continually 
disappointing results”). 
 60. See, e.g., Zander, supra note 1, at 503 (quoting a post-Lessard 
dialogue, at an involuntary commitment hearing, between a Milwaukee judge 
and defense attorney: Defense attorney: “But I just wonder if we are dealing 
with just family emotional-type problems. And, it’s a little difficult for me to 
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C.  Revolt Against Process—the Pro-Treatment Side Rises 
Again 
 
Even in the 1970s, not everyone agreed with lawyer and ex-
patient advocates that involuntary commitment was more evil than 
good. The pro-treatment voices were there, though subdued for a 
while by the reforms of that era. By the 1980s, however, pro-
treatment forces were on their way back. In 1981, in their editorial 
Dangerousness as the Criterion for Involuntary Hospitalization: A 
Time to Reassess,61 Pauline Rabin and David Folks passionately 
argued for the loosening of the involuntary commitment standard 
on the ground that the “dangerousness” criterion prevented doctors 
from treating desperately suffering patients: 
 
The present emphasis on dangerousness to self or 
others as the sole criterion on which a psychiatrist 
can enforce hospitalization of the mentally ill has 
been challenged by the physician who is confronted 
with an acutely psychotic patient and the social 
worker and community agencies on whom the 
burden of handling this group now falls . . . . Our 
dilemma as physicians is that we are forced to 
overlook the acute symptoms of mental illness and 
to intervene only if the patient’s behavior can be 
characterized as dangerous. The decision to 
hospitalize a patient involuntarily for evaluation, 
treatment, or both is a legal rather than a medical 
determination . . . . Is it not time to reassess the 
criteria for emergency involuntary hospitalization? 
. . . How can we withhold treatment from an 
acutely ill patient? Whose freedom is compromised 
by the current standards? . . . Should we not 
reintroduce broader options for emergency 
                                                                                                         
understand how full-time inpatient hospitalization at this time would be the cure 
. . . .” Court: “I have the same feeling. However, I’m not expert in psychiatric 
matters.  The experts have testified. My feelings are the same as yours, but I 
can’t disregard the expert testimony”). 
 61. Rabin & Folks, supra note 15. 
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commitment? We strongly urge that a compre-
hensive review of these questions be undertaken, 
directed toward reframing the standards for in-
voluntary commitment while safeguarding the 
patient’s fundamental civil rights.62 
 
Considering the subsequent empirical research indicating that the 
dangerousness standard had not, in fact, made significant changes 
in the rate or substantive proceedings in involuntary commitment 
cases, Rabin and Folks’ concerns may seem a bit overheated. The 
real significance of these concerns, however, lies not in their 
factual accuracy but in the attitude and orientation they reveal—that 
of the psychiatrist on the ground, in the emergency room or in the 
courtroom, faced with a suffering patient who, in the professional’s 
opinion, is in desperate “need of treatment.” While the law and the 
legal standard have remained focused on rights and procedures, 
many mental health professionals charged with implementing those 
standards continue to perceive involuntary commitment through a 
“need for treatment” lens. The pro-treatment voice became even 
more vocal in the 1980s and 1990s amid the controversies over de-
institutionalization63 and homelessness, which eventually generated 
calls for expanded rights to treatment for the mentally ill.64 As one 
author characterized the literature in 1994: 
                                                
 62. Id. at 980.  
 63. Deinstitutionalization refers to a set of government policies, during 
the mid-late twentieth century, which led to the downsizing or closure of most 
psychiatric hospitals nationwide and shrank the number of patients hospitalized 
for mental illness from more than 500,000 in 1955 to under 50,000 by 2002. See, 
e.g., Tom Jackman, Commitment Rule is Key to Changing the System: 
Interpretation of Criteria Varies Among Counties, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2007, 
at A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2007/11/ 27/ST2 
007112702512.html (“In 1955, 558,239 patients were in public psychiatric 
hospitals. By the mid-1990s, the number had dropped to fewer than 72,000. By 
2002, the total had fallen below 50,000”). 
 64. See, e.g., Haycock et al., supra note 59; Luis R. Marcos, Taking the 
Mentally Ill Off the Streets: The Case of Joyce Brown, 20 INT’L J. MENTAL 
HEALTH 7, 7 (1991) (“Hardly a section of the country, urban or rural, has 
escaped the ubiquitous presence of ragged, ill, and hallucinating human beings, 
wandering through our streets, huddled in alleyways, or sleeping over vents. . . . 
It now is apparent that a substantial portion of the homeless are chronically and 
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Reports on the failure of courts to abide by 
procedural and substantive standards, and regular 
criticism of that failure from mental health and legal 
scholars, have not appreciably advanced the practice 
of rights-based civil commitment . . . a number of 
practicing clinicians experience substantive and 
procedural guarantees as destructive of patients’ 
treatment needs, and as misguided, one-sided 
interference with the treatment of persons with 
debilitating mental disorders. The simple reiteration 
of patients’ substantive and procedural rights during 
a civil commitment hearing has neither ensured 
those rights, nor arguably advanced durable 
treatment relationships necessary to prevent 
rehospitalization.65 
 
It seems that the new standard made no one happy: It failed to 
invigorate the legal rights of mentally troubled patients, and it also 
raised a substantial obstacle to the effective treatment of patients 
who may need, but not want, psychiatric care. 
 In retrospect, this tension between the legal and psychiatric 
perspectives on the standard for involuntary commitment seems 
obvious, even inevitable. The two professions—reflected in the two 
parts of the standard—come to the policy problem with very 
different fears, very different nightmare scenarios. Nightmare #1, 
                                                                                                         
severely mentally ill men and women who in years past would have been long-
term residents of state hospitals”). 
 65. Haycock et al., supra note 59, at 266: 
By far the largest body of literature consists of both 
professional and mass media material criticizing the impact 
of stringent commitment criteria on the care  of the 
seriously mentally ill . . . . Distressed at the inability of 
clinicians to force treatment on thousands of severely 
mentally disabled persons, a number of clinicians and 
researchers have proposed modifications of procedural 
standards [that were] modeled on criminal due process, 
[and] a shift away from adversarial hearings, stringent due 
process requirements, and strict evidentiary standards. 
Id.  
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represented by the facts in Donaldson,66 envisions innocent patients 
forcibly incarcerated in a mental institution and held there by the 
ignorance, arrogance, or personal pique of the staff. By defending 
patients’ presumptive right to refuse treatment and subjecting 
requests for forcible commitment to vigorous examination by 
attorneys and judges, reformers sought to prevent such injustices. 
Nightmare #2, expressed in Donald Trefferts’s powerful phrase 
Dying With Their Rights On,67 envisions seriously disturbed (even 
if not “dangerous”) patients, helpless, unable to feed, clothe, or care 
for themselves, and left to languish on the streets because the law is 
so focused on protecting their rights that it turns away from their 
suffering. Both scenarios suggest real risks for the law.  Under a 
“need for treatment” standard that relies solely on the judgment of 
mental health professionals, the risk is that the standard will give 
rise to more Kenneth Donaldsons—patients held in mental 
hospitals, for years, against their will while the doctor supposedly 
caring for them acts against, rather than for, their interests.68 On the 
                                                
 66. And in fiction by such characters as Nurse Mildred Ratched in Ken 
Kesey’s famous novel, One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, KEN KASEY, ONE 
FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO’S NEST (1962), and Nurse Davis in the 1948 film THE 
SNAKE PIT (Twentieth Century Fox 1948). 
 67. Treffert, supra, note 15. 
 68. Reports of cases which confirming this fear are not difficult to find. 
See, e.g., Alicia Curtis, Involuntary Commitment, BAD SUBJECTS, Dec. 2001, 
http://psychrights.orgstates/Maine/InvoluntaryCommitmentbyAliciaCurtis.htm 
(Curtis, a psychiatric social worker, reports that “[h]usbands ridding themselves 
of wives via the psychiatric institution was still enough of a problem in the 
1930s that the first woman in Maine’s legislature, Gail Laughlin, authorized a 
bill penalizing husbands for bringing false testimony in the involuntary 
commitment hearings of their wives”).  More recently Curtis recalls:        
I worked with a patient who in the 1960s had been brought to 
the hospital by her husband. The chief complaint listed on the 
admitting record was: ‘Patient does not do her housework.’ I 
think she did actually have a recurrent depression, a symptom 
of which was her inability to care for herself and her home, 
but here was obviously a large overlap conceptually between 
mental illness and not functioning in a prescribed social role. 
There is also a large history of the forced treatment of 
homosexuality as mental ‘illness.’ One gay man I know has a 
familiar story. He was brought, as a teenager, to a psychiatric 
hospital in the Midwest by his parents, when they found out he 
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other hand, under a vigorous standard which seeks to protect the 
presumptive rights of patients to refuse commitment even if doctors 
or court personnel see a “need for treatment” or “grave disability,” 
the risk is that seriously ill patients, unable to care for themselves 
but unwilling to be medicated or hospitalized, will be abandoned 
on the streets to be arrested, victimized, or even killed. 
 For the law, the core issue is which risk to take—or, 
alternatively, how to arrange the relevant legal architecture into a 
standard that minimizes both risks. The law’s options are limited, 
because law in our society is closely bound to the protection of 
individual rights. It is the law’s foundational job to protect those 
rights and, in the context of involuntary commitment, to treat the 
rights of the mentally ill with the same respect as the rights of 
others. The law must care about the flawed legal standard which 
allowed Kenneth Donaldson to be held against his will for fifteen 
years although he had committed no crime and presented no 
danger. For the law, any inquiry into involuntary commitment must 
begin there. Forcing a person into treatment against her will flies 
directly in the face of the individual’s right to refuse medical or 
psychiatric treatment whether or not medical professionals agree.69 
And where no harm to others is foreseeable or expected, the right 
of a respondent to refuse treatment is especially compelling. 
Further, once we embark on a course which allows the state to 
incarcerate a person against her will on grounds of “danger to self,” 
                                                                                                         
was having gay sex. He was involuntarily committed to the 
institutional and treated for his homosexuality.  
Id. (The treatment didn’t work). See also Mike Riggs, Lost in the Madhouse: 
Three Stories of Involuntary Confinement, THE DAILY CALLER, Jan. 21, 2011, 
http://dailycaller.com/2011/01/21/lost-in-the-madhouse-three-stories-of-involunt 
ary-confinement (recounting the story of “Eric,” a Florida college student who 
in 2008 was involuntary committed, or “Baker Acted” under Florida’s forcible 
commitment statutes, apparently on extremely flimsy grounds). 
 69. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (“A 
finding of ‘mental illness’ alone cannot justify a State’s locking a person up 
against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement. 
Assuming that that term can be given a reasonably precise content and that the 
‘mentally ill’ can be identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no 
constitutional basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are 
dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom”). See also A. Stone, The 
Right to Refuse Treatment: Why Psychiatrists Should and Can Make it Work, 
38(3) ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 358 (1981). 
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the definitional question—what constitutes an actionable danger 
under the standard—becomes both vitally important, and 
enormously difficult, to resolve coherently.   
Can the reigning conceptions of “mental illness” and 
“dangerousness” resolve this issue? If we define “danger to self” in 
the usual way—as “posing a significant risk of serious physical 
harm” to oneself—then adventurers like Steve Fossett, who engage 
in risky activities because they love to confront and overcome the 
risk, are just as committable as the depressed person who drinks 
poison with the express purpose of ending his life. But should the 
concept be defined so expansively? And if not, does the “mental 
illness” prong of the test establish a rationally defensible boundary 
line? 
III. REDEFINING  “DANGER TO SELF” 
 
 Consider the following three scenarios. Scenario One: Alice 
has decided to kill herself and proceeds to the roof of her twenty-
story apartment building, intending to jump off. Alarmed by-
standers grab Alice just as she jumps, pull her to safety, and phone 
the police who deliver her to the psychiatric wing of a nearby 
hospital. Despite Alice’s clearly expressed wish to be released from 
the hospital so that she can accomplish her own death, her 
concerned family petitions the court to have her forcibly committed 
on grounds of danger to self. 
 Scenario Two: Bruce70 is a senior partner at a large urban 
law firm. Bruce works seven-day, eighty-hour weeks, and has 
always believed that his life is his work. Bruce suffers a major 
heart attack and is informed by his doctors that unless he 
dramatically reduces his workload and stress level, he will almost 
certainly suffer a second and fatal heart attack in the near future. 
Despite Bruce’s clearly expressed preference to return to work at 
his normal pace, his concerned family petitions the court to have 
him committed on grounds of danger to self. 
 Scenario Three: Christopher70 suffers from atherosclerotic 
dementia, a condition that causes periods of confusion interspersed 
                                                
 70. The characters of “Bruce” and “Christopher” are renamed versions of 
cases described in Alan Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: “A Knife 
that Cuts Both Ways,” 51 JUDICATURE 370, 375 (1968) (discussing the cases of 
“Mrs. Lake” and of Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson). 
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with periods of rationality. Christopher is neither suicidal nor 
dangerous to others. He has no close family or friends, and lives 
alone. One night the police find him wandering the streets, 
confused but not endangering anyone. They bring Christopher to 
the psychiatric wing of the local hospital and petition the court to 
have him committed for treatment. At the commitment hearing 
Christopher petitions for release and coherently testifies that he 
knows about his illness, understands its risks, but that he has spent 
time in a psychiatric facility before and prefers to take the risk of 
living on his own rather than be hospitalized again. 
 First, consider Scenario Three. Should the law grant the 
petition and commit Christopher for treatment against his will? In 
more than half the states the law permits forcible commitment not 
only in cases where a court finds a mentally ill respondent to be 
dangerousness to self or others, but also in cases involving mental 
illness and grave disability or need for treatment.71 But what should 
“count” as a grave disability? The law must have a role in deciding 
this because the answer determines when courts may overrule the 
express preference of a respondent not to be hospitalized (or 
forcibly treated, for example with drugs, on an outpatient basis). 
 By hypothesis, Christopher is not “dangerous” in the sense 
that he intends to do violence either to other people or himself. But 
the answer to the “grave disability” question must nonetheless 
depend on a concept, which is closely related to dangerousness—
the concept of harm, or risk of harm, to self. Christopher’s 
dementia, while not disposing him toward violent behavior, risks 
self-harm in the sense that he might, in a confused state, be unable 
to provide for his own basic needs or wander into a dangerous 
situation where he is vulnerable to assault by violent others. Should 
that kind of risk be a proper basis on which to overrule 
Christopher’s clearly expressed desire not to be treated for his 
dementia? 
                                                
 71. See, e.g., Legal Resources in Your State: Maine, TREATMENT 
ADVOC. CTR., http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/index.php?option=com_ 
content&view=article&id=215&Itemid=150 (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (noting 
that Maine is one of twenty-three states whose involuntary treatment standard is 
based on a person’s “need for treatment” rather than only the person’s likelihood 
of being dangerous to self or others). 
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 To answer that, we need to know what risk of harm means 
in the involuntary commitment context; what kinds of risk, and of 
risked harm, should “count” for purposes of evaluating someone 
under the standard;72 and what degree of harm, or risk of harm, 
justifies a court in acting against a respondent’s desire not to be 
treated. “Grave disability,” in this sense, is another name for 
“danger to self.”73 Assessing such disability necessarily involves 
assessing the degree of harm, or risk of harm, to the self if the 
respondent is not hospitalized/forcibly treated. In this important 
sense, investigating the content of the “danger to self” standard is 
conceptually prior to defining the boundaries of the “grave 
disability” one. 
 How, then, should the law of involuntary commitment view 
the two “danger to self” cases of Alice and Bruce? Should the law 
treat those two cases the same, or differently?  If the same, should a 
court force both Alice and Bruce into treatment, or neither? If the 
two cases call for different legal dispositions, what would justify 
that result, and which way should the relevant differences cut? By 
analyzing the range of possible answers to these questions, this Part 
illuminates some problems with the “danger to self” rule and 
articulates the basis for a fairer, more just standard, one which 
holds true to the legal values which necessarily arise when a person 
is forced into treatment against his will. 
In the cases of Alice and Bruce, four resolutions are 
possible. First, the court could grant both commitment petitions, 
forcing both respondents into treatment. Second, the court could 
deny both petitions, refusing to force either respondent into 
treatment. In choosing either of these two options, the court would 
be treating Bruce and Alice the same for purposes of involuntary 
commitment. 
Alternatively, the two petitions should be decided 
differently, an option that offers the third and fourth possible 
resolutions. Thus, the petition for involuntary commitment could be 
                                                
 72. For example, what about alcohol abuse? Consider the case of “Dan” 
that opened this Article.  See supra text accompanying note 2.  
 73. And some courts have expressly defined grave disability in those 
terms. See, e.g., Doe v. Gallinot, 486 F. Supp. 983, 991 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (grave 
disability “implicitly requires a finding of harm to self”). 
2014 Mental Illness and Danger to Self 283 
granted as to Alice but not as to Bruce, or it could be granted as to 
Bruce but not as to Alice. 
The next Section considers these four options. 
 
A. An Abolitionist Premise 
 
Again: In a legal system that takes individual rights 
seriously, the law must always have good reason to overrule a 
person’s desire to be left alone. Thus, we begin with the premise 
that unless there is good reason to force Alice, Bob, or both into 
treatment, neither one should be committed against their will. 
Further discussion becomes necessary only if we determine that the 
abolitionist position is wrong—only if there are in fact cases where 
the law clearly should order someone to be committed despite their 
contrary preference. 
Against that conceptual backdrop, what should happen to 
Alice and Bruce? The abolitionist premise would dictate that 
neither respondent should be forced into treatment. Should the 
court, then, deny both petitions? 
Consider this response: The cases of Alice and Bruce are 
not similarly situated; in fact they are polar opposites. Alice, who 
attempted suicide, represents the paradigm case in which a 
respondent should be forcibly committed, while Bruce, the 
workaholic, represents an equally obvious case in which the law 
should respect the respondent’s preference not to receive treat-
ment—in which the family’s petition for commitment should be 
denied. What might justify this view? To answer we need to think 
more deeply about what the commitment standard is, and to what 
factual situations it applies. 
Three core elements animate the “danger to self” standard: 
that, absent intervention: (1) There is a risk of serious harm to the 
self, (2) there is a high degree of likelihood that the harm will 
occur, and (3) the threatened harm is imminent, will occur within a 
very short time. Alice’s case satisfies all three elements. There is a 
risk of serious self-harm from failing to hospitalize Alice—if she is 
not forcibly hospitalized she will probably die by her own hand. 
Second, Alice’s behavior on the roof demonstrated a firm 
determination to kill herself, and she continues to demand that she 
be released so that she can try again. Thus, there is a high degree of 
likelihood that the serious harm in question—Alice’s death by 
suicide—will occur if Alice is not forcibly committed. And third, 
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Alice’s recent behavior indicates that this serious and likely harm is 
imminent—if she is not hospitalized Alice will try to kill herself 
again very soon. 
 It seems to follow that Alice is among the most compelling 
cases for forcible confinement of a person on grounds of “danger to 
self.” Such cases involve respondents who are likely to inflict 
imminent death or serious bodily harm upon themselves in the 
absence of intervention.  In this context the phrase “danger to self” 
is a summary way of describing the factors of (1) threatened 
serious harm, (2) high probability of such harm, and (3) imminence 
of such harm. 
If this is correct, then the three criteria are sufficient to 
justify hospitalization against the respondent’s will. Are these 
criteria also necessary to justify such commitment? Would 
dropping any one of the three elements sink the case for 
involuntary commitment below the normative threshold at which 
the law is justified in overriding a person’s presumptive right not to 
be incarcerated against her will? 
A brief thought experiment will test this out. First consider 
element (1), and suppose that the imminent threatened harm from 
not hospitalizing a respondent is far less serious than the person’s 
death. If the respondent was captured not while attempting to kill 
herself but while lying on a summer beach without sunscreen, few 
would feel comfortable incarcerating her against her will for 
attempting to inflict such “harm” on herself. The harm must be 
serious, amounting to a threat of death or serious self-injury. 
 The same is true for element (2). Even a person who has 
threatened to do serious and imminent harm to herself will not be 
forcibly committed if the likelihood he will actually do the harm is 
not very high. In fact mental health professionals make this kind of 
judgment all the time. Does a depressed client who says he wants 
to die really mean to kill himself, or is he merely using references 
to death as a means of expressing the sadness, emptiness, and 
hopelessness he feels while experiencing a very black mood? If the 
former, presumably the person is a candidate for hospitalization; if 
the latter, presumably not. The degree of likelihood that the serious 
and imminent harm will occur is an indispensable element of the 
calculus. 
 Finally, the case for forcible commitment would fall below 
the requisite threshold if the threatened danger to self is admittedly 
serious and credible, but is not imminent—not about to happen in 
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the immediate future. Consider the case of a forty-year-old person 
who has an inordinate fear of aging. The person believes that life 
has no meaning after age fifty, and she tells her therapist that she 
intends to kill herself on the night before her fiftieth birthday. Even 
if the client’s intent is real and the therapist believes her, the 
therapist lacks adequate cause to have the patient forcibly 
committed now, because although the client may very well follow 
through on the threat at the time she indicates, the ten-year delay 
between threat and time of harm would, and should, defeat any 
effort to have the person hospitalized against her will. The factor of 
imminence, in this sense, is a way of assuring that the threatened 
danger to self is almost certain to occur, right now, unless the 
person is hospitalized. Understood in this way, the imminence 
requirement can be seen as an adjunct to the likelihood element—
both seek to limit the law of involuntary commitment to cases in 
which failing to commit someone involuntarily will almost 
certainly lead to serious injury or death of that person. 
 The three elements—serious harm to self, high likelihood/ 
probability of such harm in the absence of hospitalization, and 
imminence of the harm—are thus both necessary and sufficient to 
commit a person involuntarily on grounds of danger to self. In the 
case of Alice, all three exist, and this explains the intuition that 
Alice is a proper candidate for forcible commitment on grounds of 
danger to self.74 
 But consider that the above test may come out exactly the 
same way in Bruce’s case as it does in Alice’s. As to element (1), 
risk of serious harm to self, Bruce’s case is quite similar to Alice’s. 
Like Alice, Bruce’s choice to refuse treatment carries the serious 
and foreseeable (actually foreseen) risk of his own death. As for 
element (2), the likelihood element, there may be a difference 
between Alice and Bruce—on the other hand, there may not. People 
sometimes live much longer than their doctors expect them to. But 
severely depressed people sometimes behave in unpredicted ways. 
Statistics indicate, for example, that between eighty-five and 
ninety-five percent of people who attempt suicide are still alive 
                                                
 74. Some state statutes also contain requirements that (1) treatment be 
available and/or that (2) the patient is likely to benefit from such treatment. See, 
e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW 9.60(C).   
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fifteen years later.75 Statistics also indicate that the five-year 
survival rate from congestive heart failure is only fifty percent—
half of those who suffer massive heart attacks die of heart failure 
within five years of diagnosis.76 The difference in likelihood of 
serious and imminent harm between Alice and Bruce may be 
negligible, or even non-existent. Further, even if there is some 
difference here, we can’t know that Bruce’s case falls below the 
likelihood threshold unless and until we know what that threshold 
is.77 Just how likely must the threat of serious and imminent harm 
to self be in order to justify involuntary commitment? On its face 
the “danger to self” standard offers no answer to this. It should. 
Finally, with respect to element (3), the imminence 
criterion, again no necessary difference divides the cases of Alice 
and Bruce. In the real-life scenario on which Bruce’s hypothetical 
case is based—that of Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson—the 
patient (Justice Jackson) suffered a serious heart attack; was 
warned that if he continued his demanding work schedule that he 
risked a fatal heart attack at any time; and in fact suffered a fatal 
heart attack shortly after he rejected the advice of his doctors and 
returned to his pre-illness schedule.78 The harm to self was in fact 
imminent, as Jackson’s doctors had warned him. Once again, even 
if this were not clear, we can’t know whether the threatened self-
harm in Bruce’s case is imminent enough to justify forcing him 
into treatment until we know what the threshold level of imminence 
actually is. 
                                                
 75. Catherine E. Bonn, Suicide and the State: The Ethics of Involuntary 
Hospitalization for Suicidal Patients, 3 INTERSECT 40, 44 (2010), available at 
http://ojs.stanford.edu/ojs/index.php/intersect/article/view/197/101 [hereinafter   
Bonn, Suicide and the State]. 
 76. See, e.g., Statistics: Heart Failure, HEART AND STROKE FOUNDATION 
OF CANADA, http://www.heartandstroke.com/site/c.ikIQLcMWJtE/b.3483991/k. 
34A8/Statistic.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2104).  
 77. In his perceptive article Psychiatry in the Legal Process, Alan M. 
Dershowitz made this point in 1968. Dershowitz, supra note 17, at 376 
(discussing an “important question which rarely gets asked in the civil 
commitment process: how likely should the predicted event have to be to justify 
preventive incarceration? Even if it is agreed, for example, that preventing a 
serious physical assault would justify incarceration, an important question still 
remains: how likely should it have to be that the person will assault before 
incarceration is justified?”). 
 78. Id. at 375. 
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Thus, if the three-pronged “dangerousness” test justifies the 
involuntary commitment of Alice, then forcing Bruce into treat-
ment too may be at least equally legitimate. 
But consider a second intuition, which seems to distinguish 
the cases of Alice and Bruce: a difference in their intent. One 
factual difference between Alice’s case and Bruce’s is that at the 
time her family petitions the court to have her forcibly committed, 
Alice has the conscious purpose and the primary intent of causing 
the serious, likely, and imminent harm in question—her own death. 
On the other hand Bruce’s course of action, although in fact it 
poses a high risk of his death and Bruce knows of that risk, was 
chosen despite that risk, not because of it. Is the presence of 
conscious purpose in Alice’s case, and its absence in Bruce’s, a 
valid basis on which to grant the family’s petition for commitment 
as to Alice and deny it as to Bruce? 
The answer must be no. To the extent that Alice’s intent to 
cause her own death makes it more likely that she will accomplish 
that result, or makes the result more imminent, perhaps such intent 
should be relevant to the court’s decision in her case (and, by 
reference, perhaps the absence of such intent should count as one 
factor in favor of denying the family’s petition in Bruce’s case) 
under the three prongs of the dangerousness standard. But intent 
alone is not a valid basis for distinguishing between Alice and 
Bruce. A moment’s thought makes this clear and also moves the 
discussion in an important new direction. 
The fundamental question in “danger to self” cases is 
whether the state has adequate reason to override the person’s 
preference not to seek treatment. Intent to cause harm to oneself, 
even a drastic harm like one’s own death, does not offer adequate 
reason to override that preference. The reason is that we can easily 
imagine situations in which a person’s choice to end her own life is 
rational; makes sense; is supported by reasons we can understand 
and with which we can sympathize (though of course we might 
ultimately disagree with it on religious or moral grounds). In 
Alice’s case, for example, what we need to know is not merely that 
she intends to kill herself, but why. If Alice intends to end her life 
because she believes that Martians have invaded her town and are 
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planning to kidnap and transport her to another planet,79 a fate 
worse than death, then (for all except abolitionists) Alice’s 
delusional motive for wanting to kill herself might give the state 
adequate reason to step in and prevent her from carrying out her 
suicide plan. On the other hand, if Alice wants to end her own life 
because she is in the end-stage of an incurable and excruciatingly 
painful form of cancer and has been told by her doctors that there is 
nothing they can do either to prolong her life or to diminish the 
suffering she will experience as the disease progresses further, then 
this is a rational and understandable motive which might merit 
respect from the state and the courts—whatever the nature of the 
contemplated self-harm, its likelihood, and/or its imminence.80 
                                                
 79. Unfortunately, such cases do happen. For example, in 1998 Russell 
Weston shot and killed two Capitol Hill police officers in the United States 
Capitol. Weston, who had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia some 
years before the killings, shot the officers because he believed they were 
blocking access to a device which would stop the United States from being 
annihilated by cannibals. See, e.g., Bill Miller, Capitol Shooter’s Mind-Set 
Detailed, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1999, at A1, available at http://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/shooting/stories/weston042399.htm   
(“Russell Eugene Weston Jr. told a court-appointed psychiatrist that he stormed 
the U.S. Capitol last summer, killing two police officers, to prevent the United 
States from being annihilated by disease and legions of cannibals. ‘He described 
his belief that time was running out and that if he did not come to Washington, 
D.C., he would become infected with Black Heva,’ wrote Sally C. Johnson, the 
psychiatrist who examined Weston last fall. Weston called this imaginary 
ailment the ‘most deadliest disease known to mankind’ and said it was spread by 
the rotting corpses of cannibals’ victims, Johnson wrote.  Weston told Johnson 
he went to the Capitol to gain access to what he called ‘the ruby satellite,’ a 
device he said was kept in a Senate safe. That satellite, he insisted, was the key 
to putting a stop to cannibalism”). See also Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 743 
(2006) (discussing defendant Eric Clark’s “undisputed paranoid schizophrenia” 
at the time he shot and killed a police officer). Witnesses testified that  
paranoid delusions led Clark to rig a fishing line with beads 
and wind chimes at home to alert him to intrusion by invaders, 
and to keep a bird in his automobile to warn of airborne 
poison. There was lay and expert testimony that Clark thought 
Flagstaff was populated with ‘aliens’ (some impersonating 
government agents), the ‘aliens’ were trying to kill him, and 
bullets were the only way to stop them. 
 Id. at 745. 
 80. See, e.g., Bonn, Suicide and the State, supra note 75. 
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Notice that the same analysis applies to Bruce. If Bruce 
chooses to continue working at his pre-heart attack pace because he 
delusionally believes that his doctors and his family are plotting his 
murder and his only chance of escape is to remain at the office,81 
that irrational motive might justify state intervention and forced 
treatment. But if Bruce’s choice to reject his doctors’ advice and 
continue to work is based on his belief that work is the most 
valuable thing in his life—or even (is this a closer case?) that all 
doctors are quacks and his own judgment about his health is more 
reliable than theirs—then, while we might personally disagree with 
his decision, the motive behind it is comprehensible and not 
irrational in the same sense as it would be in the first scenario. In 
that instance, perhaps, the state should respect Bruce’s decision. 
But if this analysis is correct, it dramatically shifts the 
argument. What now becomes crucial to the legal standard of 
involuntary commitment is not the three elements of 
dangerousness, but the reasons offered by the respondent for 
wanting to harm himself. The nature and coherence of those 
reasons—not merely the characteristics of the harm—emerge as 
                                                
 81. Again, such events do occur. For example, seventeen-year-old Eric 
Clark murdered a police officer and then challenged Arizona’s insanity defense 
on constitutional grounds in Clark v. Arizona.  Clark, 548 U.S. 735.  Clark had 
previously been diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic and had come to believe 
that his own parents were aliens and that he was in constant danger of being 
attacked or killed. See, e.g., Was Eric Clark Insane or Just Troubled?, CNN, 
April 15, 2008, available at http://sentencing.nj.gov/downloads/pdf/articles/2 
006 /0426_14_cnn.pdf; John Gibeaut, A Matter Over Mind, A.B.A. J. , Apr. 22, 
2006, available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_matter_over_ 
mind (“‘It started with the water,’ David [Clark, Eric’s father] says. Terry 
[Clark, Eric’s mother] explains:  
He thought it contained lead. He thought he was going to be 
poisoned, and we couldn’t convince him otherwise.’ Then 
came the aliens. Clark believed that Flagstaff had been 
invaded by them, and that he and the city were in danger. 
Though he still recognized David and Terry as his parents, he 
also believed they were aliens. ‘But he couldn’t tell us who 
they were or why we would be in danger,’ David says. He 
recalls his son’s matter-of-fact response when he asked Eric 
how he knew his parents were aliens: He said, ‘Bring me some 
tools and I’ll show you.’ 
Id.  
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central to the legitimacy of state coercion. Thus, in addition to a 
dangerousness component consisting of the three-pronged analysis 
outlined above, a defensible involuntary commitment standard 
contains a “rational motive” or “rational capacity” requirement 
commanding the state to uphold a respondent’s decision to forego 
psychiatric treatment unless and until the state affirmatively 
concludes that the respondent lacks the capacity to rationally 
deliberate about his own situation and to articulate reality-based 
reasons for his decision not to seek treatment. 
But the current standard for involuntary commitment does 
not require that the respondent fail a rational motive/capacity test. 
Instead, (in addition to a finding of dangerousness) it requires that a 
respondent suffer from “mental illness.”82 Is the presence of 
“mental illness” an accurate proxy for the lack of reasoning and 
deliberative capacity that could justify committing someone against 
their will? Section B engages that question. 
 
 B. Mental Illness As Grounds for Involuntary Commitment 
 
If the term “mental illness” refers only to cases in which a 
respondent’s thinking is so disordered that (s)he is unable to assess 
the risks and benefits of hospitalization, and/or to articulate a 
rational basis for declining treatment, then there is no gap between 
the actual standard and the rational basis one. Thus, clarifying the 
relevant meaning of “mental illness” is a crucial step in the 
analysis. 
1. The Problem of Definition 
 
How, then, is “mental illness” defined for purposes of 
involuntary commitment? A first response is to consult psychiatry 
and psychology and to borrow their conception of the term. But this 
turns out to be quite difficult, in large part because psychiatric and 
                                                
 82. See, e.g., State Standards for Assisted Treatment: Civil Commitment 
Criteria for Inpatient or Outpatient Psychiatric Treatment, TREATMENT ADVOC. 
CTR., Jan. 2013, http://www.treatmentcenter.org/storage/documents/Standards_ 
The_Text_June_2011.pdf (“All states and the District of Columbia have laws 
governing court-ordered hospital (inpatient) commitment of individuals with 
severe mental illness . . .”). 
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psychological terms are formed for very different purposes than are 
legal ones.  
As a first try, we might refer the concept of mental illness to 
the “bible” of psychiatric diagnosis—the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).83 The DSM is produced by 
the American Psychiatric Association and is the most widely 
accepted diagnostic instrument among clinicians in the United 
States of America.84 DSM-5 defines “mental disorder” as “a 
syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an 
individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects 
a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental 
processes underlying mental functioning.”85 DSM-IV-TR and 
DSM-5 include more than 300 possible diagnoses, ranging from 
psychological conditions which are universally viewed as serious 
(such as major depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia) to 
conditions (for example, “impairment in written expression,”86 
                                                
 83. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-
5]. The most recent version of the manual, DSM-5, took effect in May 2013. 
Most of the statutes and cases discussed in this Article were enacted during 
earlier versions of DSM. See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed., text 
rev. 2000) [hereinafter, DSM-IV-TR]; see also Allen Frances, Op-Ed., 
Diagnosing the DSM, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2012, available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2012/05/12/opinion/break-up-the-psychiatric-monopoly.html 
?_r=0 (evaluating “revisions to what is often called the ‘bible of psychiatry’–the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, or D.S.M.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Marcia C. Peck & Richard M. Scheffler, An Analysis of the 
Definitions of Mental Illness Used in State Parity Laws, 53 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVICES 1089 (Sept. 2002). 
 85. DSM-5, supra note 83, at 20.  
 86. Id. at 67 (a form of “Specific Learning Disorder” characterized by 
problems in spelling accuracy, grammar and punctuation accuracy, and clarity or 
organization of written expression). In DSM-IV-TR, “Disorder of Written 
Expression” defined as follows:   
A. Writing skills, as measured by individually 
administered standardized tests (or functional 
assessments of writing skills), are substantially below 
those expected given the person’s chronological age, 
measured intelligence, and age-appropriate education.  
B. The disturbance in Criterion A significantly interferes 
with academic achievement or activities of daily living 
 
292 Mental Health Law & Policy Journal Vol. 3 
“impairment in mathematics”87 and “caffeine intoxication”88) 
which seem much less disabling to the threshold capacities for 
deliberation and reason that are at issue here. In short, the range of 
conditions to which DSM attaches the word “disorder” is quite 
wide, including at one end of the spectrum the schizophrenic 
person who suffers from psychotic delusions and hallucinations,89 
                                                                                                         
that require the composition of written texts (e.g., 
writing grammatically correct sentences and organized 
paragraphs).  
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at 56.   
 87. Id. (a form of Specific Learning Disorder characterized by problems 
with memorization of arithmetic facts, accurate or fluent calculation, number 
sense, and accurate math reasoning). In DSM-IV-TR, “Mathematics Disorder” is 
defined as follows:  
A. Mathematical ability, as measured by individually 
administered standardized tests, is substantially below that 
expected given the person’s chronological age, measured 
intelligence, and age-appropriate education.  
B. The disturbance in Criterion A significantly interferes with 
academic achievement or activities of daily living that 
require mathematical ability.  
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at 54.  
 88. Id. at 503 (recent consumption of high dose caffeine which is 
accompanied or followed by signs/symptoms, such as restlessness, nervousness, 
excitement, insomnia, psychomotor agitation.) See also DSM-IV-TR, supra note 
83, at 232 (defining “Caffeine-induced Sleep Disorder”). A Caffeine-Induced 
Sleep Disorder is a variant of Substance-Induced Sleep Disorder characterized 
by the following: 
   A.  A prominent disturbance in sleep that is sufficiently 
severe to warrant independent clinical attention.  
                  B.  There is evidence from the history, physical 
examination, or laboratory findings of (1) or (2):  (1) 
the symptoms in Criterion A developed during, or 
within a month of, [Caffeine] Intoxication or 
Withdrawal . . . . 
 C.       The disturbance is not better accounted for by a Sleep     
              Disorder that is not [caffeine] induced.  
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at 660.  
     89. See, e.g., DSM-5, supra note 83, at 87–88 (Schizophrenia Spectrum 
and Other Psychotic Disorders characterized by “key features” including 
delusions, hallucinations, and disorganized thinking). See also DSM-IV-TR, 
supra note 83 (Defining schizophrenia).  Schizophrenia in relevant part, is  
defined as follows:  
                  A.       Characteristic symptoms: Two (or more) of the following,     
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and at the other end the person whose over-consumption of coffee 
or soda interferes with his sleep. Indeed, recent research suggests 
that almost half the U.S. population will meet the criteria for a 
DSM diagnosis during their lifetimes.90 Although DSM explicitly 
cautions that its diagnostic categories “may not be wholly relevant 
to legal judgments,”91 many states and the federal government have 
                                                                                                         
           each present for a significant portion of time during a 1-month     
                           period (or less if successfully treated).  At least one of these    
                           should include 1, 2, or 3. (1) delusions; (2) hallucinations; (3)    
                           disorganized speech; (4) grossly abnormal psychomotor  
                           behavior, including catatonia; (5) negative symptoms, e.g.,  
                           diminished emotional expression or avolition. 
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at 312.  
 90. According to Ronald Kessler, Professor of Health Care Policy at 
Harvard Medical School, almost half the United States population becomes 
“eligible” for a DSM-IV diagnosis at some point in their lives. See, e.g., Wynne 
Parry, “Normal or Not? New Psychiatric Manual Stirs Controversy,” 
LIVESCIENCE.COM, May 19, 2013, www.livescience.com/34496-psychiatric-
manual-stirs-controversy (“More than 46 percent of the U.S. population will 
meet the criteria for at least one DSM-IV diagnosis during their lifetimes, 
according to research published by [Kessler and his colleague Philip Wang]”). 
 91. The phrase is from the Cautionary Statement in DSM-IV-TR, supra 
note 83, at xxxvii.  
The Cautionary Statement’s purpose is to provide clear 
descriptions of diagnostic categories in order to enable 
clinicians and investigators to diagnose, communicate 
about, study, and treat people with various mental disorders. 
It is to be understood that inclusion here, for clinical and 
research purposes, of a diagnostic category such as Path-
ological Gambling or Pedophilia does not imply that the 
condition meets legal or other nonmedical criteria for what 
constitutes mental disease, mental disorder, or mental 
disability. The clinical and scientific considerations in-
volved in categorization of these conditions as mental 
disorders may not be wholly relevant to legal judgments, for 
example, that take into account such issues as individual 
responsibility, disability determination, and competency.  
Id. DSM-5, supra note 83 at 25 also contains a “Cautionary Statement for 
Forensic Use of DSM-5,” which states in relevant part:  
Although the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria and text are 
primarily designed to assist clinicians in conducting clinical 
assessment, case formulation, and treatment planning, 
DSM-5 is also used as a reference for the courts and 
attorneys in assessing the forensic consequences of mental 
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used the manual as the definitional referent in legislation relevant 
to “mental illness” in a variety of contexts.92 
Of course DSM categories are primarily designed to detect 
mental disorders for the purpose of treating them. And in that 
context—a context in which there is no question of weighing the 
costs of rights violations against the benefits of psychological 
treatment—they make perfect sense. If diagnosis and treatment are 
the goals, then defining “mental illness” should be about 
identifying treatable conditions whether or not they involve 
dangerous or risky behavior. 
That changes radically, however, in a legal setting where a 
respondent’s very freedom may depend on the presence or absence 
of a diagnosable “mental illness.” The problem is made more acute 
by the ambiguity surrounding causation in those state commitment 
statutes which set out the two elements—“dangerous to self or 
others” and “mental illness”—without specifying any particular 
causal relationship between them.93 Must the diagnosed “mental 
illness” or “mental disorder” be the primary cause of the 
                                                                                                         
disorders. As a result, it is important to note that the 
definition of mental disorder included in DSM-5 was 
developed to meet the needs of clinicians, public health 
professionals, and research investigators rather than all of 
the technical needs of the courts and legal professionals. 
Id. The statement goes on to say that DSM-5 diagnostic categories can be useful 
to courts and legislatures, “[f]or example, when the presence of a mental 
disorder is the predicate for a subsequent legal determination (e.g., involuntary 
civil commitment).” Id. Of course the question addressed here is whether the 
legal standard for involuntary commitment should contain a predicate that 
renders the law dependent on the conception of “mental disorder” developed by 
the mental health profession.  I argue that it should not. 
 92. See, e.g., Peck & Scheffler, supra note 84, at 1090 (making the point 
that in federal legislation the phrase “mental illness” has been interpreted to 
include all disorders in the D.S.M.). 
 93. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.  § 17a-498(c) (West 2009)(stating 
“. . . If, on such hearing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 
the person complained of has psychiatric disabilities and is dangerous to himself 
or herself or others . . . it shall make an order for his or her commitment, 
considering whether or not a less restrictive placement is available, to a hospital 
for psychiatric disabilities”).  See also id. § 17a-495(a) (stating that “dangerous 
to himself or herself or others’ means there is a substantial risk that physical 
harm will be inflicted by an individual upon his or her own person or upon 
another person. . . .).  
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respondent’s dangerous behavior? If not, then courts, perhaps 
convinced of a respondent’s dangerousness, might be tempted to 
force the person into treatment as long as any mental illness can be 
identified by the court psychologist or psychologist. Suppose, for 
example, the respondent threatens to harm himself, and also 
happens to suffer from mathematics disorder or disorder of written 
expression. Can the court commit him for treatment whether or not 
the disorder is a causal factor in the respondent’s behavior or 
treatment preferences? Or suppose the respondent undoubtedly has 
a serious mental illness—suffers from schizophrenia and is actively 
psychotic at the time of the petition. Should the presence of an 
active psychosis suffice to satisfy not only the mental illness 
requirement but also the requirement of dangerousness?94 These are 
core questions for the law, questions that the treatment-focused 
diagnostic categories of psychiatry cannot (and were not intended 
to) answer. 
2. In Search of a Legally Intelligible Standard 
 
On two variants of the abolitionist view, either (1) there is 
no such thing as “mental illness” and those who defend involuntary 
commitment based on that concept are agents of social oppression 
                                                
 94. See, e.g., Dershowitz, supra note 17, at 374.  The involuntary 
commitment statutes  
authorize preventive incarceration of mentally ill persons 
who are likely to injure themselves or others. Generally, 
‘injure’ is not further defined in the statutes or in the case 
law, and the critical decision—whether a predicted pattern 
of behavior is sufficiently injurious [in today’s terms, 
“dangerous”] to warrant incarceration—is relegated to the 
psychiatrist’s unarticulated judgments. Some psychiatrists 
are perfectly willing to provide their own personal 
opinions—often falsely disguised as expert opinions–about 
which harms are sufficiently serious. One psychiatrist 
recently told a meeting of the American Psychiatric 
Association that ‘you’—the psychiatrist—have to define for 
yourself the word danger, and then having decided that in 
your mind. . . look for it with every conceivable means. . .  
Id. The Dershowitz article was published in the late 1960s. Has the reformed 
“dangerousness” standard that took hold in the 1970s and 1980s sufficiently 
strengthened the rights of patients since then? This Article suggests that the 
answer is “no.” 
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against the different and the powerless;95 or (2) even if “mental 
illness” does exist, the mentally ill should be treated in exactly the 
same manner as others for purposes of involuntary commitment.96 
Absent a previous or impending criminal charge, civil preventive 
detention on grounds of dangerousness alone is strongly disfavored 
in the law.97 Abolitionists believe that the preferences of mentally 
disordered people should be accorded equal respect—that their 
choice to refuse psychiatric treatment should be as dispositive as it 
would be for any person.98 Thus, abolitionists would argue that 
even a severely depressed respondent who is openly suicidal should 
not be forced into treatment despite her continuing and clearly 
serious wish to kill herself. If that suicidal person is released 
without treatment and then kills herself, a true abolitionist argues 
                                                
 95. See generally, from opposite ends of the political spectrum: (1) the 
views of Thomas Szasz, SZASZ, supra note 28; and (2) the views of R.D. Laing, 
R.D. LAING, THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE 1, 118–40 (1967). 
 96. See, e.g., Rabin & Folks, supra note 15, at 990 (describing this 
abolitionist view). 
 97. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on 
Preventive Detention, 76 B.U.L REV. 113, 114 (1996) (“The strong presumption 
against preventive detention and the relatively limited means to accomplish it 
ensure that, in absolute terms, the dangerous undetainables are vastly greater in 
number than the dangerous detainables . . . .”). The state’s power of preventive 
detention has greatly expanded when founded upon a pre-existing criminal 
charge, or prior criminal history of a defendant. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, 
Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429–30 (2001). Laypersons have traditionally 
thought of the criminal justice system as being in the business of doing justice:  
punishing offenders for the crimes they commit. Yet during the past several 
decades, the justice system’s focus has shifted from punishing past crimes to 
preventing future violations through the incarceration and control of dangerous 
offenders. Habitual-offender laws, such as “three strikes” laws, authorize life 
sentences for repeat offenders . . . “Sexual predator” statutes provide for the civil 
detention of sexual offenders who remain dangerous at the conclusion of their 
criminal commitment. New sentencing guidelines increase the sentence of 
offenders with criminal histories because these offenders are seen as the most 
likely to commit future crimes. These reforms boast as their common 
denominator greater official control over dangerous persons, a rationale readily 
apparent from each reform’s legislative history. Id. (citations omitted).  
 98. See, e.g., Paul Chodoff, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally 
Ill as a Moral Issue, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 384 (1984) (contrasting the stance 
of “medical model” with that of civil libertarians on the issue of involuntary 
commitment). 
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that this potential consequence must be accepted as a cost of 
respecting the civil rights of the mentally disordered—just as we 
ought to respect the right of Justice Jackson to continue a stressful 
work schedule despite the knowledge that doing so risks his 
demise, or the right of adventurers such as Steve Fossett who 
choose to go solo ballooning around the world because they love 
and embrace the risk. 
To be sure, even some who are generally sympathetic to the 
abolitionist perspective balk at the prospect of releasing an actively 
psychotic respondent (for example, a delusional schizophrenic who 
plans to jump from a building because he believes he will sprout 
wings and fly) without treatment. In his perceptive essay What is 
So Special About Mental Illness?,99 the philosopher Joel Feinberg 
articulated a quasi-abolitionist position, which incorporates this 
exception. According to Feinberg, when a person’s mental illness 
“so affect[s] the cognitive processes that [s]he is unable to make 
inferences or decisions,”100 the state may exercise its “sovereign 
power of guardianship”101 in the person’s behalf and force the 
person into treatment. 
On its face, Feinberg’s standard—which would make only 
those mental disorders which render the person “unable to make 
inferences or decisions” a proper basis for involuntary commit-
ment—sounds a lot like the rational motive standard articulated 
above. But Feinberg then further defines the standard in a way that 
draws a bright, but inaccurate, line between cognitive disorders, 
which he argues can serve as psychological predicates for state 
intervention against a person’s preferences, and “emotional” or 
“volitional” disorders, which should not. Feinberg states:  
 
By no means all mentally ill persons . . . suffer from 
defects of reason.  Many or most of them suffer 
from emotional or volitional disorders that leave 
their cognitive faculties quite unimpaired. To 
impose compulsory therapy on such persons would 
be as objectionably paternalistic as imposing 
                                                
 99. Joel Feinberg, What Is So Special About Mental Illness?, in DOING 
AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 272 (1970). 
 100. Id. at 279. 
 101. Id. 
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involuntary cures for warts or headaches or tooth 
decay.102  
 
Thus, for purposes of forcible commitment Feinberg conceptualizes 
two clearly distinct groups of mental illnesses: (1) those which 
deprive the person of his or her rational faculties and can justify 
involuntary commitment when such commitment is in the rational 
best interest of the patient, and (2) those—“many or most”—which 
involve “emotional or volitional disorders that leave [the person’s] 
cognitive faculties quite unimpaired” and thus render involuntary 
commitment unjustifiably coercive in the same way that forcing a 
person into treatment for warts or tooth decay would be coercive. 
Feinberg’s position implies that a respondent who suffers 
from a severe mood disorder (without psychotic features) should be 
treated as autonomous and rational for purposes of the commitment 
statutes. The state should respect that person’s preference not to be 
hospitalized, since in such cases the person’s disorder is 
“emotional” rather than “cognitive.” Thus, a person who is severely 
depressed and thinks constantly of killing himself suffers merely 
from an “emotional” problem and should be treated as fully rational 
and competent for the purposes of involuntary commitment. A 
court would have no legitimate cause to interfere with such a 
person’s decision to reject hospitalization so that he may kill 
himself. 
Feinberg’s model rests upon a background dichotomy 
between the cognitive and the emotional, between mind and mood. 
And for the law this model has great intuitive appeal. It adopts a 
generally rights-oriented, abolitionist stance while also carving out 
a category of serious, cleanly defined mental disorders which 
disable the core cognitive capacities that merit respect and 
deference from the liberal state. 
Further, the Feinberg standard would easily adjudicate some 
involuntary commitment cases, those at the extremes. Thus, 
suppose that Alice wants to jump off a building because her 
internal voices are telling her she can fly; or that Bob works all the 
time because he delusionally believes that his family are Martians 
                                                
 102. Id. (emphasis added). 
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in disguise and if he goes home they will kill him.103 Both cases 
involve psychotic disorders that interfere with the patients’ thinking 
and ability to make reality-based inferences and decisions. Under 
the Feinberg model, the state could justifiably intervene, in the 
rational best interest of respondents, and force both Alice and 
Bruce into psychiatric treatment. On the other hand, if Alice wants 
to jump in order to end the excruciating, escalating, and un-
avoidable pain from her terminal illness; or Bob continues his full-
tilt work schedule because work is the most important thing in his 
life and he would rather be able to work all the time for a few 
months than live for years without the work he loves; those desires 
(although many might disagree with them) are rationally 
comprehensible and coherent. Thus, the courts in such cases should 
respect respondents’ preferences to refuse treatment and deny the 
commitment petitions. 
 If all mental disorders did clearly fall into distinct and 
separate “cognitive” and “emotional” categories, Feinberg’s quasi-
abolitionist model would be a natural solution to the problem of 
balancing need for treatment with respect for individual rights.  But 
reality is much messier than this. Contemporary psychological 
science convincingly argues that no firm boundary divides the 
cognitive from the emotional, nor does such a clean separation 
divide normality from mental illness.104 Even schizophrenia, the 
mental disorder most closely associated (at least in the public mind) 
with impairment of a person’s cognitive abilities, does not neatly fit 
this paradigm. For one thing, schizophrenia has an important 
emotional component. The so-called “negative” symptoms of the 
disorder, characterized by depression, low energy, and flat 
emotional affect, can be extremely disabling, and may be more 
resistant to treatment, than the “positive” or cognition-disabling 
symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions.105 And when we 
                                                
 103. Again, such events do occur in ways that affect legal rights. See, e.g., 
supra notes 79, 81 (describing cases of Russell Weston and Eric Clark). 
 104. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Gray, Brain Systems That Mediate Both Emotion 
and Cognition, 4 COGNITION AND EMOTION 269 (1990). See generally Mick 
Power & Tim Dalgleish, COGNITION AND EMOTION: FROM ORDER TO DISORDER 
(2d ed. 2008). 
 105. See, e.g., S.M. Stahl & Peter F. Buckey, Negative Symptoms of 
Schizophrenia: A Problem That Will Not Go Away, 115 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA 
SCANDINAVICA 4 (2007); Stephen M. Erhart et al., Treatment of Schizophrenia 
 
300 Mental Health Law & Policy Journal Vol. 3 
begin to consider the most serious emotional disorders such as 
major depression,106 Feinberg’s dichotomy completely breaks 
down. Like schizophrenia, major depression is defined both by 
cognitive and emotional symptoms—by thoughts and by moods. 
The DSM-IV-TR defined “major depressive episode”, the basis for 
a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder, to include a variety of 
physical and cognitive symptoms—the former including emotions 
such as sadness, insomnia, significant weight changes; the latter 
including “feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate 
guilt . . . nearly every day,” “diminished ability to think or 
concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every day,” and “recurrent 
thoughts of death . . . recurrent suicidal ideation without a specific 
plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for committing 
suicide.”107 At another end of the mood spectrum, DSM also 
                                                                                                         
Negative Symptoms: Future Prospects, 32 SCHIZOPHR BULL 234 (2006); P.F. 
Liddle, The Symptoms of Chronic Schizophrenia: A Re-examination of the 
Positive-negative Dichotomy, 151 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 145 (1987). See also 
DSM-5, supra note 83, at 87–88 (Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic 
Disorders characterized by “key features” including “negative symptoms” such 
as “diminished emotional expression”). 
 106. DSM-IV-TR categorized the Depressive and Bipolar Disorders as 
“mood disorders.” DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at 382, 369. DSM-5 categorizes 
the two types of disorder separately:  “Depressive Disorders” and “Bipolar and 
Related Disorders.” DSM-V, supra note 83, at 155, 123.  
 107. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at 160–61. For purposes here, DSM-5 
closely parallels DSM-IV-TR in this respect. DSM-5 defines “major depressive 
disorder” in distinctly (though not exclusively) emotional terms: 
Diagnostic Criteria [:] 
A. Five (or more) of the following symptoms have been  
present during the same 2-week period and represent a 
change from previous functioning; at least one of the 
symptoms is either (1) depressed mood or (2) loss of 
interest or pleasure. 
1. Depressed mood most of the day, nearly every 
day, as indicated by either subjective report (e.g., 
feels sad, empty, hopeless) or observation made by 
others (e.g., appears tearful). (Note: In children and 
adolescents, can be irritable mood.) 
2. Markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or 
almost all, activities most of the day, nearly every 
day (as indicated by either subjective account or 
observation). 
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defines Generalized Anxiety Disorder as a mixture of emotional 
and cognitive symptoms (e.g., “Excessive anxiety and worry 
(apprehensive expectation), occurring more days than not for at 
least six months, about a number of events or activities (such as 
work or school performance.”).108 
                                                                                                         
3. Significant weight loss when not dieting or 
weight gain (e.g., a change of more than 5% of body 
weight in a month), or decrease or increase in 
appetite nearly every day. (Note: In children, 
consider failure to make expected weight gain.) 
4. Insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day. 
5. Psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every 
day (observable by others, not merely subjective 
feelings of restlessness or being slowed down). 
6. Fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day. 
7. Feelings of worthlessness or excessive or 
inappropriate guilt (which may be delusional) nearly 
every day (not merely self-reproach or guilt about 
being sick). 
8. Diminished ability to think or concentrate, or 
indecisiveness, nearly every day (either by sub-
jective account or as observed by others). 
9. Recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of 
dying), recurrent suicidal ideation without a specific 
plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for 
committing suicide. 
Id. at 160–61.    
 108. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83. Similarly, among the Anxiety Disorders 
in DSM-5, Generalized Anxiety Disorder is defined as follows:   
Diagnostic Criteria 300.02 (F41.1) [:]  
                  A. Excessive anxiety and worry (apprehensive 
expectation), occurring more days than not for at 
least 6 months, about a number of events or activities 
(such  as work or school performance). 
   B.        The individual finds it difficult to control the worry. 
   C.        The anxiety and worry are associated with three (or  
               more) of the following six symptoms (with at least  
                             some symptoms having been present for more days  
                             than not for the past 6 months): 
Note: Only one item is required in children. 
 1. Restlessness or feeling keyed up or on  
                 edge. 
 2. Being easily fatigued. 
 3. Difficulty concentrating or mind going      
 
302 Mental Health Law & Policy Journal Vol. 3 
 The DSM definitions of these two paradigmatic 
“emotional” disorders reflect a foundational belief in modern 
psychology and psychiatry: That mental disorders are not cleanly 
separable into “emotional” and “cognitive” categories, and (by 
implication) that rules grounded in such a separation do not reflect 
current thinking or the best science in the mental health 
professions.109 
                                                                                                         
                blank. 
 4. Irritability. 
 5. Muscle tension. 
 6. Sleep disturbance (difficulty falling or  
                staying asleep, or restless, unsatisfying  
                sleep). 
   D.  The anxiety, worry, or physical symptoms cause 
clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning. 
   E.  The disturbance is not attributable to the 
physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of 
abuse, a medication) or another medical condition 
(e.g., hyperthyroidism). 
   F.  The disturbance is not better explained by another 
mental disorder (e.g., anxiety or worry about having 
panic attacks in panic disorder, negative evaluation in 
social anxiety disorder [social phobia], contamination 
or other obsessions in obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
separation from attachment figures in separation 
anxiety disorder, reminders of traumatic events in 
posttraumatic stress disorder, gaining weight in 
anorexia nervosa, physical complaints in somatic 
symptom disorder, perceived appearance flaws in 
body dysmorphic disorder, having a serious illness in 
illness anxiety disorder, or the content of delusional 
beliefs in schizophrenia or delusional disorder). 
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at 222.   
 109. See, e.g., Alice M. Isen, Some Perspectives on Positive Feelings and 
Emotions:  Positive Affect Facilitates Thinking and Problem-Solving, in 
FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS: THE AMSTERDAM SYMPOSIUM 263 (Antony 
Manstead, Nico Frijda, & Agneta Fischer eds., 2004):  
The work reviewed in this chapter indicates that positive affect 
facilitates careful, thorough thinking and problem solving, and 
promotes a flexible, responsive approach to situations that 
fosters new learning as well as utilization of existing 
knowledge. Evidence indicates that these processes also 
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 For the law of involuntary commitment, this matters. It 
matters because once we acknowledge the impossibility of 
separating “cognitive” from “emotional” disorders—that mental 
disorder almost always involves both cognitive and mood-related 
components and the two are intricately bound up with each other—
then we are forced to admit that a very wide range of disorders 
could form the psychological predicate for a finding of “mental 
illness” in the involuntary commitment context. Someone suffering 
from a serious mood disorder—say, Major Depression—may be 
prey to mental confusion, a slowing of cognitive processes 
generally, and/or constant thoughts of suicide, thoughts which are 
as integral a part of her disorder as the sad mood which 
accompanies them.110 Such thoughts can interfere with normal 
cognitive functioning in serious and dramatic ways, and it is hard to 
see how the law would be any more justified in ignoring such 
cognitive deficits than it would be in ignoring the disabled mental 
processing of the schizophrenic whose cognitive abilities are 
distorted by delusions.  Of course, confusion, sadness, and other 
symptoms of depression can be more or less severe depending on 
the case. But that is also true with schizophrenia, whose sufferers 
may display a wide variety of positive and negative symptoms and 
who possess varying levels of ability to cope with such 
symptoms.111 If schizophrenia “qualifies” under the mental illness 
                                                                                                         
facilitate pro-social behavior and flexibility in social 
perception . . . .Thus, the chapter argues for a concept-
ualization that integrates affect, cognition, and behavior/ 
motivation (the traditional trichotomy of mind) and recognizes 
the fact that they mutually influence one another.  The chapter 
argues against the common assumption that affect and 
cognition are separate, competing systems or approaches, and 
shows, instead, that they have mutual influence and are subject 
to similar processes. 
Id.  
 110. See supra, note 107 (DSM description of Major Depressive 
Disorder). 
 111. DSM-5, in fact, speaks of a “schizophrenia spectrum,” reflecting a 
current belief in psychiatry that many mental disorders are best conceptualized 
along a continuum as opposed to the “there or not there” categorization featured 
in the previous editions of DSM. DSM-5, supra note 83, at 87–88 (defining 
Schizophrenia Spectrum). Further, recent research suggests that some 
schizophrenic patients can benefit from Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, which 
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criterion of the forcible commitment standard, then so should any 
illness which can potentially disable the patient’s normal cognitive 
functioning.  Thus, the person suffering from Major Depression, 
who is tormented by convictions of worthlessness as well as 
constant thoughts of killing himself, and eventually tries to act on 
those thoughts, is potentially of as much concern as the person who 
decides to jump off a building because she is delusional and 
convinced that, even if the fall kills her, she will immediately come 
back to life. 
 This realization helps greatly to focus the argument because 
it confirms the importance of the rational capacity theory suggested 
above.  What should concern the law of involuntary commitment is 
not the presence or absence of a “mental illness,” but (1) the 
presence or absence of the threshold capacities to deliberate about 
options and choose a rational course of action; and (2) the clear 
presence of a causal link between the lack of such threshold 
capacities, on the one hand, and the state’s justification for over-
riding the person’s refusal of treatment on the other. Persons whose 
behavior presents a risk of serious self-harm and who lack the 
capacity to make rational choices about whether or not to accept 
treatment may be committed against their will for the purpose of 
restoring such capacities and returning the decision about further 
treatment back to them. Testimony from mental health 
professionals—for example, as to the respondent’s actual level of 
cognitive functioning and ability to deliberate and reason, or the 
availability of treatments which could alleviate or cure any 
cognitive deficits—may be helpful to the law in such cases.  But no 
formal finding of “mental illness” should be required since “mental 
illness,” by itself, is not what the law should care about; the 
capacity to reason and deliberate is. 
                                                                                                         
can help them learn to control their hallucinations and delusions and the 
behavior results therefrom. See, e.g., Douglas Turkington, David Kingdon & 
Peter J. Weiden, Cognitive Behavior Therapy for Schizophrenia, 163 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 365 (2006) (reporting that “[a] growing body of evidence supports 
the use of cognitive behavior therapy for the treatment of schizophrenia” and 
concluding: “The strength of the evidence supporting cognitive behavior therapy 
for schizophrenia suggests that this technique should have more attention and 
support in the United States.”). See generally DAVID KINGDON & DOUGLAS 
TURKINGTON, COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL THERAPY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA (1994). 
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 One significant potential benefit of changing the rules in 
this way is that it promises to end the subliminal tug-of-war 
between the legal (rights-focused) and psychiatric/psychological 
(treatment-focused) halves of the commitment standard as it exists 
today.  In the 1970s, lawyers led the reform effort which created 
the two-pronged “danger and mental illness” standard that still 
dominates state commitment statutes across the nation. The idea 
was to give courts a doctrinal basis (through the dangerousness 
prong) on which to guard the rights of respondents who chose not 
to receive hospitalization or psychiatric treatment.  But the 
standard’s “mental illness” prong seems to command the input of 
the mental health profession, whose conception of mental disorder 
has been formed with the primary goal of treating patients, not of 
assessing their ability to decide matters relevant to their legal 
status.  Although in particular cases the application of the 
commitment standard can be informed by testimony from mental 
health professionals, the standard must ultimately speak in terms 
that are wholly accessible to legal, rather than medical, judgments. 
What we need, in short, is a purely legal standard which 
contains (1) a dangerousness element; (2) a cognitive capacity 
element designed to gauge the respondent’s ability to exercise 
autonomous judgment on the question of hospitalization or other 
psychiatric treatment; and (3) a causal element explicitly linking 
the legitimacy of state intervention to the respondent’s deliberative 
and reasoning capacities. 
This might seem to be an alien idea—the search for a purely 
legal standard whose fundamental purpose is to assess a 
defendant’s cognitive abilities.  But to find an instructive analogy 
we need only look across the border from the civil to the criminal 
law, to the criminal law’s defense of insanity. In Part C, I pursue 
such an analogy. 
C.  Comparing Insanity  
 
The criminal law applies a strong presumption that 
defendants are responsible—that they possess the threshold 
capacities necessary in order to obey the law and to deserve blame 
(and therefore punishment) if they do not.112 The law admits a 
                                                
 112. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, The Presumption of Sanity:  Bursting the 
Bubble, 25 UCLA L. REV. 637, 637 (1977–78) (“It was Lord Chief Justice 
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small number of affirmative defenses—defenses that might excuse 
or justify what would otherwise be a crime—on grounds either (1) 
that the defendant did the right thing under the circumstances (e.g., 
self-defense and necessity) or (2) that the defendant did the wrong 
thing but could not help it because, for example, at the time of the 
otherwise criminal act the defendant suffered from a mental disease 
or defect which rendered her unable to understand what she was 
doing, to know it was wrong, or to control her impulse to do it 
(e.g., insanity).113 Thus, in insanity cases the law admits the 
possibility that a person might not be responsible if her mental 
defect was such that it caused her to lack threshold cognitive or 
moral capacities at the time of the act.114 
“Insanity” is now considered a purely legal term; both 
lawyers and psychologists are taught this, and it is repeated so often 
on both sides as to be a cliché.115  But for most of its long life, 
                                                                                                         
Tindal, responding to the questions posed by the House of Lords in Daniel 
M’Naghten’s Case, who first popularized the principle that ‘every man is 
presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be 
responsible for his crimes.’ This so-called presumption of sanity is operative and 
unquestioned in every American jurisdiction today.”). 
 113. See, e.g., the so-called M’Naghten test for insanity (which follows 
the standard laid down by Justice Tindal in M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. 
Rep. 718 (H.L.) (“[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be 
clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused 
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to 
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he 
did not know he was doing what was wrong.”); and the American Law Institute 
(ALI) insanity test, according to which “A person is not responsible for criminal 
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he 
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Most American 
jurisdictions have adopted one or another of these tests in some version. See, 
e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749–52 (Souter, J., for the majority) 
(discussing the various incarnations of the insanity defense among the states). 
 114. See, e.g., the M’Naghten test for insanity (which follows the standard 
laid down by Justice Tindal in M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 
(H.L.); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 115. See, e.g., Ryan Howes, The Definition of Insanity is…, PSYCHOLOGY 
TODAY (July 27, 2009), http://www.psychologytod-ay.com/blog/in-therapy/200 
907/the-definition-insanity-is (“To be clear, insanity is a legal term pertaining to 
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insanity was a medical term—one that defined the realm of mental 
illness and was proudly worn by those who sought to treat it.  Some 
facts about insanity’s journey from medicine to law will inform the 
attempt to articulate the proper civil standard for involuntary 
commitment. 
 
1. The Battle Over Insanity, or Why Psychiatry “Gifted” 
Insanity to the Law 
 
In a fascinating article, What’s in a Name? A Brief Foray 
into the History of Insanity in England and the United States, 
historian Janet Tighe details the early twentieth-century battle 
between law and psychiatry over the concept of insanity.116 Tighe 
attempts to put this struggle in historical perspective, arguing that 
“[u]ntil well into the [nineteenth] century the word insanity was 
ubiquitous, not only in medical writing but in that of the legal and 
lay world as well.  It was the general term used by both professions 
and the public to refer, in the words of the 1851 Webster’s 
Dictionary, to the ‘state of being unsound in mind’ and ‘applicable 
to any degree of mental derangement from slight delirium or 
wandering, to distraction.’”117 Medical texts, law texts, and court 
opinions freely used the word,118 as did the organizations and 
publications of those who treated the mentally ill.119 Both the 
                                                                                                         
a defendant’s ability to determine right from wrong when a crime is 
committed.”). 
 116. Janet Tighe, What’s in a Name? A Brief Foray into the History of 
Insanity in England and the United States 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & 
LAW 252 (2005) [hereinafter Tighe, What’s in a Name?]. 
 117. Id. at 253. 
 118. M’Naghten’s case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, is only one famous 
example. 
 119. See, e.g., Tighe, What’s in a Name?, supra note 116, at 253 (“Use of 
the term [“insanity”] appears to have been relatively unproblematic for members 
of the legal and medical profession. Law texts, legislation, and cases are littered 
with it, as are medical texts in which the term is used interchangeably with 
unsound mind, deranged, crazy, non compos mentis, lunacy, madness, and 
alienation . . . . Even the first bodies of nationally organized medical 
professionals in the United States and Great Britain, the asylum superintendents, 
proudly used the word . . . in the name of their organizations (e.g., the 
Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane) 
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medical and legal professions shared a sense that, if they did not 
always agree about the meaning of insanity, it was nonetheless 
important to share the term and to have a common language by 
which to understand and articulate the nature of mental illness in 
both the asylum and the courtroom.120 
That began to change in the late nineteenth century, partly 
as a result of growing rifts within what would become the 
professions of psychiatry and forensic psychology, and partly as a 
result of substantive debates over particular concepts, particularly 
the idea of “moral insanity,” which highlighted the varying needs 
and approaches toward mental illness of medical professionals on 
the one hand and the law on the other. The emerging field of 
neurology, which sought dominance of psychiatry around this time, 
viewed insanity as an unscientific concept that belonged to a 
receding era of failed asylum treatments.121 In 1909, the American 
Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology deputized its committee 
on Insanity and Criminal Responsibility—which included prom-
inent medical figures such as William A. White and Adolf Meyer—
to create and propose a joint vision of the insanity defense. “Over 
and over again, their efforts broke down as the lawyers . . . and the 
physicians tried to explain to each other what they meant by 
insanity. Ultimately agreeing to disagree, the committee drafted 
model legislation, which all the physicians felt was woefully 
inadequate.”122 The failure to agree on common language to de-
scribe mental illness foreshadowed the ejection of the term 
“insanity” from the psychiatric realm —the outright “gifting” of 
insanity to the law: 
 
                                                                                                         
and in their journal titles, such as the American Journal of Insanity (which is the 
parent of the American Journal of Psychiatry”) (citations omitted). 
 120. Id. at 254 (“Initially taking for granted the shared language of 
insanity, [American Physician Isaac] Ray and many others interested in the 
topic, including legal scholars, such as Frances Wharton, saw this sharing as a 
good thing. The first versions of Ray’s text and Wharton’s . . . underlined the 
need to have the law, medicine, and the public all speaking the same language. 
That they could find situations in which this was not the case, particularly in the 
courtroom, dismayed both of them and inspired their efforts to educate and 
reform the insanity defense.”) (citation omitted). 
 121. Id. at 254−55. 
 122. Id. at 255. 
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By the 1930s, their dream of a shared medical-legal 
language and a common object of analysis was 
nothing more than ceremonial rhetoric. Embedded 
in their very word choice was the belief that law and 
psychiatry were focusing on very different things. 
The law was developing mechanisms by which 
knowledge about mental illness could be introduced 
into a legal proceeding and used with other relevant 
information to make decisions about such legal 
categories as responsibility and competence. Psych-
iatry, on the other hand, was developing mech-
anisms for diagnosing and treating illness and 
disease. To confuse the two would only spell 
disaster or at least more years of . . . the pointless 
wrangling in the courtroom that psychiatrists like 
White and Meyer so abhorred.123 
 
 Unlike insanity, involuntary commitment is not a criminal 
concept or process, and that substantive distinction should not be 
forgotten. But speaking structurally rather than substantively, the 
history of insanity is enormously instructive here, for at least two 
reasons. First, it illuminates a problem that lies at the core of the 
law-and-psychiatry dialogue not only in the insanity context but 
also in the civil commitment one: the difficulty of marrying 
concepts of mental disorder and disease that are formed for the 
purpose of diagnosis and treatment, with the conceptions of 
individual rights and responsibility that animate our law. This is a 
problem that eventually proved unsolvable in the insanity context, 
with the result that insanity came to be viewed as a legal and not a 
psychiatric concept. The criminal law, of course, calls on mental 
health professionals for their assessments and expert testimony in 
cases where the insanity defense is at issue. But both professions 
now understand that although psychiatric assessment and input can 
be helpful, the ultimate judgment as to a defendant’s insanity is a 
legal decision that can, and should, be made in terms intelligible 
and responsive to the law’s central concerns about blameworthiness 
and responsibility, not to psychiatry’s concern about treatment or 
cure. 
                                                
 123. Id. at 256. 
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 Second, the terms and the structure of the criminal insanity 
defense ought to inform the legal-psychiatric conversation about 
involuntary civil commitment. Both the M’Naghten and the 
American Law Institute (ALI) versions of the insanity defense124 
contain three fundamental requirements: (1) the presence of a 
mental disease or defect; (2) a causal link between such disease or 
defect and the defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime; and 
(3) a description of the mental capacities at issue in assessing the 
defendant’s responsibility for the act (s)he committed. Thus, the 
M’Naghten Rule prescribes: 
  
[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it 
must be clearly proved that, at the time of the 
committing of the act, the party accused was 
laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease 
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of 
the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he 
did not know what he was doing was wrong.125 
 
And, the ALI version states:  
 
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if 
at the time of such conduct as a result of mental 
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either 
to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law.126 
 
Important differences exist between the two formulations.  Again, I 
focus here on three structural requirements they share: (1) presence 
of a mental disease/defect; (2) which has caused psychological 
disabilities127 that (3) deprived the accused of relevant threshold 
                                                
 124. See M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.); see also 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(Proposed Official Draft 1962).   
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. In a sense the insanity standard contains two causal elements: (1) a 
requirement that the defendant’s incapacities were caused by “mental disease or 
defect,” and (2) a requirement that it is those incapacities which deprived the 
defendant of the relevant knowledge/appreciation of what he or she was doing 
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knowledge (or, under the ALI test, “appreciation”)—such as the 
knowledge that the defendant was squeezing someone’s neck, not a 
lemon, or the knowledge that (s)he was doing something that is 
considered morally wrong; or of threshold capacities such as the 
capacity to control his/her impulse to break the law. 
 Consider the first requirement, that defendant suffer from a 
“mental disease or defect.” On its face this seems to raise the same 
problem that we saw with the involuntary commitment standard—it 
seems to call for a medical judgment rather than a legal one. But 
appearances are deceiving in this instance. At least in part, the 
“mental disease or defect” requirement is a hangover from bygone 
days when insanity was widely used in both the medical and legal 
worlds.128 But a second fact is even more important. To the extent 
it inescapably refers to the medical understanding of psychological 
disorder, the insanity test’s mental disease/defect element continues 
to cause the same problems which led to psychiatry’s “gifting” of 
insanity to law a century ago—the problems of disagreement and 
confusion over whose conception of “mental disease” should 
govern, and over the precise meaning of “mental disease or defect” 
in the context of each particular case.129 In fact, the mental disease 
element is best understood structurally rather than substantively—
that is, it functions simply to rule out insanity claims by certain 
defendants, such as those whose mental disabilities at the time of 
the criminal act were self-inflicted by intoxication or other means. 
                                                                                                         
when he or she did the act. It is not clear that these two conceptions of cause are 
identical.  At the very least, the second formulation seems crucial to construction 
of a purely legal commitment standard. Id. 
 128. For example, M’Naghten’s Case was published in 1843.  
M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.). 
 129. See State v. Guido, 191 A.2d 45 (N.J. 1963) (court-appointed 
psychiatrists examined defendant and found her to be legally sane. After 
meeting with defendant’s attorney the psychiatrists changed their opinion, 
finding defendant insane.  On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that  
the change was thoroughly consistent with honesty however mistaken it might 
be. . . . Specifically, the doctors originally understood that the “disease of the 
mind” required by [M’Naghten] means a psychosis and not some lesser illness 
or functional aberration. As the result of their pretrial debate with [the defense 
attorney], the doctors concluded that they had too narrow a view of M’Naghten 
and that the “anxiety neurosis” they had found did qualify as a “disease” within 
the legal rule, and hence . . . defendant did not know right from wrong and she 
did not know what she was doing was wrong because of that “disease.” Id.  
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On that interpretation, the requirement of mental disease or defect 
may be the law’s way of restricting the defense to those persons 
who suffer relevant psychological incapacities through no fault of 
their own. Read in this way, the element remains entirely 
explicable in law language, focusing on blameworthiness and 
responsibility. 
 It is the remaining two elements of the insanity tests that are 
most illuminating for the civil commitment standard. Those two 
elements (2) articulate the incapacities that may excuse a defendant 
from responsibility, and (3) require that those incapacities be the 
cause of defendant’s lack of threshold knowledge or self-control at 
the time of the act.  In the next section I argue that these two prongs 
offer a compelling model for involuntary civil commitment. 
 
2.  Toward a Purely Legal Standard for Involuntary 
Commitment 
 
 Consider, again, the basic structural elements of such a 
standard – elements that, if satisfied, justify the state in overruling a 
respondent’s preference not to be hospitalized or receive 
psychiatric treatment. Those elements are: (1) danger/risk of harm 
to self; (2) the presence of cognitive and deliberative incapacity 
that (3) deprives the respondent of the capacity to make a rational 
decision about treatment. Contra Feinberg, any mental illness, 
mental disorder, or mental condition could be the basis for these 
disabilities—but mental illness or disorder per se is not required. 
 The elements can be translated into a civil standard that, 
like the criminal insanity defense, refers the involuntary commit-
ment decision entirely to the law and thus ends the tug of war 
between rights and treatment that has characterized the standard for 
decades. 
 A standard crafted along these lines would require two 
primary findings: that the respondent poses a serious, likely, and 
imminent risk of harm to self, and that he or she lacks the 
capacities to understand his/her difficulties; deliberate about the 
benefits and costs of treatment; and make a rational decision in 
his/her own best interests. Such incapacity would justify state 
intervention to force treatment over the respondent’s objection. 
Thus, a model statute might provide: 
 
2014 Mental Illness and Danger to Self 313 
A person shall be eligible for involuntary 
hospitalization if the court finds based upon clear 
and convincing evidence, that:  
(1) the respondent is unable to make a rational and 
informed decision as to whether or not treatment 
would be desirable, and 
(2) the respondent poses a serious and imminent 
risk of harm to self . . . .130 
 
The clear and convincing standard of proof would require a 
persuasive demonstration (not merely more likely than not, as a 
preponderance standard would allow) of the respondent’s lack of 
capacity, thus offering some protection against the possibility that 
the mere refusal to be treated would be taken as proof of the 
respondent’s lack of ability to make a rational decision. And, the 
“danger to self” criterion would filter out cases in which the 
defendant’s incapacity does not pose a serious threat to his or her 
well-being or that of others. Psychiatric/psychological testimony 
could of course be relevant to proving either or both elements, but 
no explicit finding of “mental illness” or “mental disorder” would 
be necessary. The ultimate judgment about whether to confine 
someone against their will would reside where it belongs: with the 
law, attuned to the language of rights and accustomed to assessing 
the harm and the cognitive capacities of persons who come before 
it. 
                                                
 130. Compare this hypothetical model statute with ALA. CODE § 22-52-
10.4 (1975), which contains the “rational and informed decision” language 
above, but also mandates a finding of mental illness:  
 (a). A respondent may be committed to inpatient treatment 
if the probate court finds, based on clear and convincing 
evidence that (i) the respondent is mentally ill; (ii) as a result 
of the mental illness the respondent poses a real and present 
threat of substantial harm to self and/or others; the respondent 
will, if not treated, continue to suffer mental distress and will 
continue to experience deterioration of the ability to function 
independently; and (iv) the respondent is unable to make a 
rational and informed decision as to whether or not treatment 
for mental illness would be desirable. 
Id.  
314 Mental Health Law & Policy Journal Vol. 3 
The proposed standard honors core intuitions that inform 
our law. One is that the state should not forcibly incarcerate 
someone only because he or she is mentally ill; there should be a 
strong presumption that mentally disordered persons, as persons, 
are generally able to make their own decisions and act in their own 
best interests. Under the proposed standard, before being 
committed against her will a person must lack certain cognitive and 
deliberative capacities to make a rational and informed decision 
about treatment.131 
A second intuition is that the law should not lock people up 
only for doing things that pose a “danger to self”—things that risk 
self-harm or even risk life. Only if the respondent poses such a risk 
and lacks the capacity to make his/her own decisions about 
treatment would the law be justified in stepping in. Thus, the 
standard could not force Dan the heavy drinker into treatment. It 
could not force adventurers like Steve Fossett into treatment. It 
could not force Justice Jackson, who continued working against 
medical advice, into treatment. And, it could not force Bruce or 
Alice into treatment as long as they possessed capacity to make 
rational decisions about whether or not to receive psychiatric 
care.132 
Third, the proposed standard steps away from the 
requirement of “mental illness” and focuses the inquiry squarely on 
the capacities, which ought to determine the limits of state 
intervention. 
Finally, the proposed standard clarifies the cases of Alice 
and Bruce in ways that match our intuitions about the role of law 
both as the guardian of individual rights and as parens patriae—
again, without reference to the presence or absence of “mental 
                                                
 131. Compare the insanity defense, which operates in a similar way.  
Everyone acknowledged, for example, that Eric Clark, the defendant in Clark v. 
Arizona (discussing defendant Eric Clark’s “undisputed paranoid schizophrenia” 
at the time he shot and killed a police officer), was mentally ill and actively 
psychotic at time of the crime. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 743 (2006). Yet, 
the trial court determined Clark was not insane, but was mentally ill and was 
aware of what he was doing and that it was wrong. Id.  
 132. What counts as a “rational decision” is, of course, fundamental in 
this context. What the law tries to gauge is a respondent’s threshold capacity to 
make decisions, not whether his or her particular decision about treatment is 
approved by, or dovetails nicely with, the intuition of the court.  
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illness.” Thus, if Alice (a) refuses treatment because she fears an 
imminent Martian invasion and wants to die before it occurs, the 
state may intervene on the grounds that her delusional thinking 
demonstrates a lack of capacity for making a rational choice about 
treatment. But if (b) Alice chooses to take her own life because she 
can no longer bear the pain of her terminal disease and there is, in 
fact, no chance she will get better or that her pain level will drop 
significantly, then the state should not intervene—even if most 
people, including the court, believe they would choose differently 
in her place. If Bruce (a) decides to shorten his life by working 
because he delusionally believes he cannot go home since his 
family is plotting to kill him, the commitment petition could be 
granted.  But if Bruce, like Justice Jackson, simply (b) values his 
work above everything else in life and chooses to take the risk that 
his work schedule will hasten his death, the state would not 
intervene—even if most people, including Bruce’s family and the 
court, believe that his values are wrong and that he should choose 
differently.133 Decisions (a) demonstrate the lack of capacities to 
                                                
 133. A potential problem arises when courts focus on assessing the 
content of a respondent’s reasons in order to gauge their capacity to make 
choices about treatment. In the examples above, content seems obviously 
relevant in assessing capacity. But, the standard should prevent courts from 
conflating reasons with capacity in the sense that disagreement with a 
respondent’s reasons proves respondent’s lack of capacity. Reasons are relevant 
to, but not dispositive of, capacity and the commitment standard must clearly 
establish that distinction. But in many cases it would seem quite possible to do 
this. See Dershowitz, supra note 17, at 375. Dershowitz discusses the case of 
sixty-two-year-old Mrs. Lake, who “suffers from arteriosclerosis which causes 
periods of confusion interspersed with periods of relative rationality.” Id. One 
day she was found wandering around downtown Washington looking confused 
but bothering no one, whereupon she was committed to a mental hospital. She 
petitioned for release and at her trial testified, during a period of apparent 
rationality, that she was aware of her problem, that she knew that her periods of 
confusion endangered her health and even her life, but that she had experienced 
the mental hospital and preferred to assume the risk of living–and perhaps 
dying–outside its walls. Id. Mrs. Lake’s petition for release was denied. Id. 
Under the standard articulated in this context, the petition for release would have 
been granted on the grounds that although her illness produced confusion and 
clearly interfered with her cognitive capacities generally–and although the 
courts and most people might disagree with her decision to refuse 
hospitalization–the reasons she gave for refusing treatment demonstrate a 
capacity to think clearly about her illness and its potential consequences and to 
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deliberate and choose in a rational way; decisions (b) demonstrate 
the presence of such capacities although the actual choice produced 
may be unusual or unpopular. The proposed standard achieves the 
appropriate goals and according to the right (legal) values—
protecting rights; guarding individual autonomy; and showing 




In the decades since legal advocates for the mentally ill 
successfully fought for a rights-based dangerousness element in the 
standard for involuntary commitment, that success has come under 
continuous attack from the treatment-focused side of the 
conversation. From the perspective of the mental health profession, 
whose primary concern is that mentally disordered people get the 
treatment they need, a rights-based standard for involuntary 
commitment threatens to leave vulnerable patients unprotected.134 
And, as deinstitutionalization emptied state psychiatric hospitals in 
the mid-to-late twentieth century, that fear seemed to become 
reality. Deinstitutionalization generated a fierce debate not only 
about the relationship between mental illness and homelessness but 
more generally, about the availability of treatment for persons with 
serious mental illness.135 This, in turn, has led to a significant shift 
in focus, in both the scholarly and popular media, away from the 
need to win legal rights for the mentally ill and toward getting them 
treated.136 State statutes have shifted focus accordingly; most now 
allow a person to be committed for inpatient treatment against 
                                                                                                         
weigh the costs and benefits of inpatient treatment against those of living outside 
the hospital. 
 134. Thus, the phrase “dying with their rights on.” Treffert, supra note 15. 
 135. See H. Richard Lamb, Deinstitutionalization and the Homeless 
Mentally Ill, 35 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 899 (1984). 
 136. See, e.g., Minds on the Edge, supra note 15; “Frontline: The New 
Asylums,” www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/asylums (2005) (jails and 
prisons have become “the new asylums” for mentally-ill persons who commit 
crimes); FRONTLINE: THE RELEASED, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/fro-ntline/shows 
/released (2009) (tracing the experiences of mentally ill inmates released into the 
community). See generally, Eliminating the Barriers, supra note 4 (advocating 
legal rules that would make it easier to commit mentally ill persons 
involuntarily). 
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his/her will on grounds of “grave need for treatment” or something 
similar—the standard that predated the reforms of the 1970s.137 
Further, more than half the states now allow involuntary outpatient 
treatment, permitting courts to order compliance with an out-of-
hospital psychiatric treatment regime that the patient does not 
want.138 The widespread adoption of involuntary outpatient 
commitment potentially expands the reach of forced treatment 
regimes to cover a much larger group of mentally ill persons than 
would be reachable under the standard for involuntary inpatient 
treatment.139 
                                                
 137. See, e.g., Treatment Advocacy Center, Improved Treatment 
Standards, TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/soluti 
on/improved-treatment-standards (majority of states allow commitment on 
grounds of need for treatment such as “grave disability”). 
 138. See supra, note 82.   
 139. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.2 (1975).  The Alabama statute 
states that:  
A respondent may be committed to outpatient treatment if the 
probate court finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence 
that: (1) the respondent is mentally ill; (ii) as a result of the 
mental illness the respondent will, if not treated, continue to 
suffer mental distress and will continue to experience 
deterioration of the ability to function independently; and (iii) 
the respondent is unable to make a rational and informed 
decision as to whether or not treatment for mental illness 
would be desirable.  
Id.; GA. CODE. ANN. § 37-3-61(2) (West 2013) (“Any person may file with the 
court a petition executed under oath alleging that a person within the county is a 
mentally ill person requiring involuntary treatment.”); GA. CODE. ANN. § 37-3-
1(12.1) (West 2013).  The Georgia statute states that:  
‘Outpatient’ means a person who is mentally ill and: (A) who 
is not an inpatient but who, based on the person’s treatment 
history or current mental status, will require outpatient 
treatment in order to avoid predictable and imminently 
becoming an inpatient; (B) Who because of the person’s 
current mental status, mental history, or nature of the person’s 
mental illness is unable voluntarily to seek or comply with 
outpatient treatment; and (C) who is in need of involuntary 
treatment.  
Id.; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(C) (McKinney 2013).  The New York 
statute states that:  
A person may be ordered to receive assisted outpatient 
treatment if the court finds that such person: (1) is eighteen 
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This Article, therefore, bucks the winds of current opinion 
by arguing for a renewed focus on rights rather than treatment. But 
that change in focus is necessary. It is time to end the tug of war 
between psychiatry and law that underlies the “mental illness and 
danger to self” standard. Forcible commitment is a legal decision 
that must be fully articulated in legally relevant language and 
justified by a legally comprehensible rationale. 
For the law, such a rationale must be grounded in respect 
for individual autonomy, including the autonomy of those who may 
suffer from mental disorder. The argument for a purely legal 
commitment standard must rid itself of the more extravagant anti-
psychiatry claims which characterized this debate in the 1960s and 
1970s—for example, the claim that psychiatry is shilling for the 
capitalist establishment by forcing people into hospitals in order to 
maintain a docile and compliant proletariat;140 that involuntary 
commitment is a method society uses to enforce bourgeois values 
and silence the creative, the diverse, and the different by labeling 
them as “deviant”;141 or that mental illness itself is a myth created 
                                                                                                         
years of age or older; and (2) is suffering from a mental 
illness; and (3) is unlikely to survive safely in the community 
without supervision, based on a clinical determination; and (4) 
has a history of lack of compliance with treatment for mental 
illness. . . . and (5) is, as a result of his or her mental illness, 
unlikely to voluntarily participate in the outpatient treatment 
that would enable him or her to live safely in the community; 
and (6) in view of his or her treatment history and current 
behavior, is in need of assisted outpatient treatment in order to 
prevent a relapse or deterioration which would be likely to 
result in serious harm to the person or others as defined in 
section 9.01 of this article; and (7) is likely to benefit from 
assisted outpatient treatment.  
Id.  
 140. See id. at 150 (“The asylum reduces differences, represses vice, 
eliminates irregularities.  It denounces everything that opposes the essential 
virtues of society . . . .”). See, e.g., Foucault, supra note 28; Andrew T. Scull, 
Madness and Segregative Control: the Rise of the Insane Asylum, 24 SOC. 
PROBS. 337 (1976) (rise of the insane asylum as social control mechanism to 
enforce capitalist social order);  GOFFMAN, supra note 28 (psychiatric labels 
subject the “deviant” to depersonalizing and stigmatizing practices). 
 141. See, e.g., Rael Jean Isaac & Virginia C. Armat, The Origins of Anti-
Psychiatry, in MADNESS IN THE STREETS: HOW PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 
ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL (1990). 
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by psychiatry to increase its own power and influence in society at 
the expense of the most vulnerable.142 
Shed of over-heated political rhetoric, fundamental 
principles reveal themselves. There is such a thing as mental 
disorder. Mental disorder can be disabling and can involve such 
severe distortions of thought and reality perception that a person 
might not be able to know his or her own best interest. There is no 
clean line dividing cognitive from emotional disorder; mental 
disorder may involve cognitive impairment accompanied by 
emotional deprivations, as in schizophrenia, or disturbances of 
thought and cognition that originate in mood or emotional 
disruption, as in major depression. In a small number of cases a 
person’s psychological disorder can be so severe, and can be 
accompanied by such substantial risk of self-harm, as to deprive the 
person of the capacity to make rational choices about treatment. In 
such cases, the state may hospitalize a person against his will. But 
forced hospitalization cannot be justified by a mere diagnosis of 
mental illness; of behavior that poses risk of harm to self; or of 
both together. Only where a person poses a serious risk of self-
harm and is unable to make a rational and informed decision about 
whether or not to receive treatment, may the law force him or her 
into psychiatric care.  
 
 
                                                
 142. See, e.g., supra note 28. For an argument that the theoretical 
innovations brought to DSM-III were in part a reaction to these anti-psychiatry 
critics, see Wilson, supra note 58, at 402–03. 
